[Colonel Haseman retired from the US Army in 1995, after 16 years of experience in defense liaison work – 13 in Indonesia and three in Burma. During this time, which included five years as US defense attachi to Indonesia, Colonel Haseman naturally became one of the premier US experts on the Indonesian military. He developed close contacts with a host of mid-level officers who have since risen to the military's top ranks. Now in retirement in Colorado, Col Haseman works as a part-time consultant, author and seminar speaker. On September 24th, the Van Zorge Report contacted Col Haseman for his personal views on the East Timor situation.]

TNI in East Timor

Van Zorge Report: First, when we speak of the Indonesian military (TNI) in East Timor, is it appropriate to regard it as a unified entity? Or are there different elements working for varied or even conflicting purposes? If so, what are the main elements?

Colonel Haseman: I believe there are three groups within, and influencing, the Indonesian military leadership these days. There is the "moderate" group, which is striving for genuine military reform-in parallel with political and economic reform. There is the "hard-line" group, which advocates a return to the Soeharto-era status quo with the perks and powers of a highly political military force. Finally, There are the "fence sitters", the largest group, waiting to see the results of the competition between the first two groups.

In my view, based on the information available and my own analysis, the operation to destabilize and brutalize East Timor was a deliberately planned covert operation carried out in accordance with orders issued by someone in authority over at least some elements of the armed forces. A decision was made to use the "security approach" to attain a pro-integration vote in East Timor or, failing that, to either negate that vote or so destabilize the territory that it would take years of time and a huge financial investment by the outside world to make East Timor a viable country.

This "security approach" was forced by hard-liners inside and outside TNI (i.e., retired military and civilians), as well as senior government officials. The intelligence apparatus and covert operations assets from Kopassus [Army Special Forces] and the police were utilized to implement most of the operation. They took a basic militia organization in East Timor-originally raised and supported by Kopassus and intelligence units-expanded it greatly by recruiting both East Timorese and non-East Timorese, and used it as a surrogate force to intimidate the populace into supporting integration.

I believe that a considerable number of TNI personnel were involved in this covert operation. Also involved were a number of ethnic East Timorese from two territorial battalions and the territorial structure, and the police, permanently assigned to East Timor, who either deserted from their units or were under orders from the covert operation agents. This combined militia/TNI/police force perpetrated most of the violence and physical damage in East Timor prior to the announcement of the ballot results in early September as well as afterwards.

The operation was doomed by a major intelligence failure, which must have predicted that the covert security operation would succeed in gaining a pro-integration vote or the other objectives previously mentioned, and which grossly underestimated the anti-integration feeling of the East Timorese. I saw the same thing happen in Burma in 1990, when the Burmese military intelligence apparatus openly predicted that the government party would win about two-thirds of the national vote, based on their "polling" of the population. Despite that prediction, the National League for Democracy of Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi won more than 80 percent of the vote.

The East Timor operation also failed to achieve a key element of any covert operation: plausible denial. The operation was conducted in full view of the international press, foreign diplomats, UN observers and NGOs.

Repeated assertions of "progress" on the part of senior TNI officers and government officials was a blatant denial of the real situation that was clearly visible to the outside world. Those bizarre efforts to insist that TNI had met its promises to maintain security only added to the discredit heaped on TNI and the Indonesian government.

Some of the later destruction (burning of towns, barracks, etc.) was done by departing Kostrad [Army Strategic Reserve] and non-Timorese territorial units acting either on orders from their chain of command, or from a lack of discipline arising from extreme frustration and anger.

It is wrong, in my view, to ascribe what happened in East Timor to all of TNI. I hope that the majority of TNI personnel, while distressed at the "loss" of East Timor, are also dismayed and angered by the atrocities committed by TNI elements and their militia surrogates in East Timor. That atrocious behavior has brought humiliation to Indonesia, discredited its national and military leadership, ruined the reputation of TNI as a whole, and elicited international criticism and disgrace for TNI as a professional military organization. In effect, years of effort to build professionalism within TNI have been destroyed in the eyes of the outside world.

What do you believe to be the nature of the relationship between military units in East Timor and the military's commanders in Jakarta, particularly Wiranto?

I do not know. But there is one cardinal principle of military command: "The commander is responsible for all that his men do-or fail to do." Elements and personnel of TNI, acting under the orders of somebody in authority, conducted reprehensible acts in East Timor, failed to perform their mission to provide security and order in the province, and failed to fulfill the commitment of their nation given to the United Nations. By this universally accepted principle of command responsibility, the TNI commander-in-chief is responsible for what happened in East Timor, whether or not he actually gave the orders that resulted in this terrible tragedy.

From your experience, how would you characterize the army's discipline and the effectiveness of its command structure?

I have been greatly disappointed, dismayed, disillusioned, and angered by the lack of discipline and command effectiveness displayed by TNI over the past six to eight months. The vaunted discipline of TNI has been shown to be ineffective and subject to manipulation by elements outside the normal chain of command.

"Amok" is an Indonesian word frequently applied to out-of-control crowd behavior. Individuals, units, and elements of TNI ran amok in East Timor because of the inability of the national command structure to act effectively and because of the "hands off" approach ordered because of the on-going covert operation to destabilize East Timor.

TNI's Goals

What is your theory on why the military aided and abetted the integrationist militias during their rampage during the second week of September?

As I mentioned previously, I do not believe the entire TNI aided and abetted the militias in East Timor. Only certain members of the senior leadership and chain of command, covert operations elements, and territorial forces in East Timor committed the atrocities perpetrated in East Timor. As to the goals of that rampage I can only speculate. Perhaps the primary objective was to ensure a pro-integration vote, based on faulty intelligence that the operation could achieve that goal. It failed.

A secondary objective may have been to "set an example" to other potentially secessionist movements elsewhere in Indonesia and/or to leave East Timor so damaged that it would be an international basket case for years to come. Finally, those responsible may have felt that TNI had been so weakened by reformist movements and by criticism for human rights abuses revealed during the past 18 months, that this operation was essential to emphasize that the military is still the most powerful and influential element in Indonesian society. It is a sad commentary that those responsible for this operation sank to such a low level. There are many other, positive, courses of action that could have made the same point.

Indonesia, like all nations, needs a respected, and respectable, armed forces. Right now those two adjectives – respectable and respected – are totally lacking in my characterization of TNI. If a goal of the security approach was to send a signal of intimidation to secessionists elsewhere, could this signal prove effective, or will it backfire by further alienating the Acehnese, Irianese, etc.?

I believe there is a very good chance that the "lesson" will backfire badly. Aceh is an entirely different ball game to East Timor. Aceh resounds within the overall Indonesian community to an extent that East Timor never has. Irian Jaya perhaps a bit less so. But were I a secessionist in either grouping, I would certainly be looking at what happened in East Timor – regardless of my degree of dedication or personal bravery.

Why did Wiranto stall for so long with regard to allowing UN peace-enforcers to enter East Timor, when that stance was so damaging to his and Indonesia's-standing with the international community?

I can only speculate. Perhaps he deliberately determined to ignore the bad news coming from East Timor, or thought it was exaggerated. Or, if he was complicit in the deliberate violence of the covert operation, it was important for him to attempt to stall outside evaluations of the situation in East Timor. Remember, it was only after he accompanied five United Nations ambassadors into Dili itself that he saw first-hand the terrible nature of damage, violence, and mayhem that had occurred. At that point, surely, he realized that matters were out of control and could not be restored by TNI without outside assistance.

What has been the role played by Maj Gen Zacky Anwar in East Timor, and to what extent does this reveal the stance of the military's high command?

I have read much of the speculation about Maj Gen Zacky's role in East Timor. But since I do not have personal knowledge of what Maj Gen Zacky's role might have been, I will not comment.

Have you noticed any signs of dissension within TNI's high command with regard to East Timor policy?

I am puzzled and disappointed that there has been no voice raised in public by moderate officers at the senior echelons of TNI. I know that there are many officers who must be terribly opposed to the policies of the hard-liners, anguished at what happened in East Timor, and very unhappy about what has happened to the reputation of TNI as a result of this tragedy. Where were their voices? I can only speculate that they have been deliberately silenced by hard-liner elements, perhaps by threats against their person, their families, or their character.

Interfet Mission

How do you assess the Interfet mission, overall, thus far? From your experience as an army officer, will a force of 7,000 be adequate to secure the entirety of East Timor?

I have only the information available to the rest of the world. From that I believe that the Interfet mission has gone very well in its initial phase. However, I personally believe the force should be larger to meet the challenges discovered since the force entered East Timor. The damage to the entire infrastructure of East Timor, the great humanitarian assistance needed, and the threat posed most specifically in those districts that border on West Timor, require a larger force if all these challenges are to be met adequately.

Fortunately, a good part of East Timor in the center and east can be controlled with relative ease by a combination of Interfet and elements of the pro-independence forces that have, to their credit, refrained from being drawn into a civil war by the actions of the pro-Indonesian militia forces. The bulk of Interfet's attentions must go to the territory's western districts, where the militias have specifically threatened attacks.

Do you expect armed resistance from militia groups?

I do, unfortunately. Some of the non-East Timorese militia members will fade away. Others, forced to participate, may be able to disengage. Some hard-core militia forces will remain, regardless of the decision to continue funding a covert operation in East Timor. Much depends on a national-level decision in the Indonesian government: those who authorized the "security approach" covert operation must now decide whether to continue to support guerrilla warfare against the Interfet force-and, ultimately, against the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), against world opinion, and against the best interests of Indonesia.

It takes a lot of money to fund this type of operation. Where are the funds are coming from? As "Deep Throat" told Bob Bernstein during his Watergate investigation in the US, "Follow the money".