The popular consultation moved into a new phase this week, with the end of the registration process and the beginning of the political campaign period, which is scheduled to run through August 27. As the campaign period begins, The Carter Center notes no significant improvements in the security situation in East Timor or fulfillment by the Government of Indonesia (GOI) of its security obligations under the May 5 New York agreements. Indonesian Army, police, and civil officials have failed to intervene against or have actively participated in attacks on pro-independence supporters' activities.

The Carter Center does note the recently announced change in military command in Dili. Further, the U.N. Secretary-General's Special Envoy Jamsheed Marker has issued a statement concerning Indonesian military support for pro-integration militias, assuring that measures are being taken to correct the situation.

Nevertheless, of particular concern to The Carter Center observers during the past week were the following developments:

• Intimidation, including explicit death threats, of UNAMET personnel, which has continued in several districts. In one location, UNAMET CIVPOLs officials were assaulted while attempting to protect students who were being attacked by pro-integration militia.
• Harassment of pro-independence elements, particularly students and National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) political party workers, which has increased sharply in some locations.
• A substantial increase in the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), with thousands of new IDPs in Viqueque, where an Aug. 11 attack resulted in two deaths, and a worsening of conditions of IDPs in Suai and Same.

Carter Center observers also collected further information that reinforces our previous reports. This includes continued examples of the Indonesian military (TNI) supporting and directing armed pro-integration militias and the police watching passively as militia attacked pro-independence groups, although in at least one case police protected the opening of a CNRT office.

New evidence also shows a strengthening of existing militias and a spread across East Timor of more aggressive pro-integration militias. GOI officials continue to actively campaign for the integration option, and to provide food, other resources, and support to pro-integration groups. Carter Center observers also have seen an unevenly balanced distribution of campaign opportunities in some districts.

Meanwhile, there has been no perceptible movement toward the concentration of TNI troops into district centers, nor has there been any reduction in TNI troops in East Timor. In fact, according to one authoritative report, troop strength is being reinforced.

To date, we have seen little demonstration of GOI behavior designed to create the necessary conditions for a free, open, and democratic consultation in East Timor. There remains widespread concern that continued insecurity could jeopardize the consultation process.