John McBeth, Jakarta – When Indonesia's top generals gathered at the Command and Staff College in Bandung in September 1998 to consider the future of the armed forces, they were finally forced to admit that under former President Suharto's New Order regime, the military had stretched dwifungsi – its "dual function" roles of a political as well as security force – far beyond what was envisaged when it was created in the 1950s.

"Those who conceived dwifungsi," a seminar summary noted, "couldn't anticipate the possibility that a future president would have a direct position in the command hierarchy and use that influence for his own social and political interests." That's a startling admission of what had gone wrong under Suharto's 32-year rule, even if it doesn't acknowledge the army's willingness to play along with Suharto.

For decades the military has justified a central role in politics and society based on its revolutionary role in the struggle for independence. But Suharto ensured that the military's muscle was harnessed to his own interests. Reinforced by systematic depoliticization and a territorial apparatus stretching from the smallest village to Jakarta's corridors of power, it also served as a constant reminder that civilians weren't to be trusted.

Now, disorientated by Suharto's abrupt departure and in the middle of an uncertain transition, the Indonesian armed forces have lost their compass. They're hesitant about dealing with social unrest, lying half in and half out of the nation's political life and struggling to make a choice between the regiments of reformation and the squadrons of the status quo.

With its legislative representation dwindling and civilians seemingly gaining the upper hand, it must choose between clinging to what remains of its power, or adopting a professional, back-to-the-barracks ethos. "With these sort of political dynamics we have now, we're in an identity crisis," says one senior Indonesian military source. "There's no middle way to put ourselves into a new political role. The only real choice we have is to make a complete swing into professionalism."

Politically, the military's post-election role is as clouded as the poll result itself. It holds 38 of the 500 seats in the newly elected House of Representatives, the national legislature, down from 75. Top generals assert that the armed forces will steer clear of the post-election coalition-building process and don't want to be seen as the parliamentary swing vote. "Before it was easy because we channelled our aspirations through Golkar {the ruling party} and supported the president," says the military source. "Now we are meant to be equidistant {from political parties}, but a point will be reached where we will have to choose sides."

The key test of neutrality is likely to come in October when the 700-strong People's Consultative Assembly (the legislature plus 200 others drawn from provincial parliaments and ethnic, social and religious groups) meets to choose a new president. The armed-forces chief, Gen. Wiranto, is being openly courted by Golkar as a prospective vice-president – and is even looked on in some quarters of the Jakarta elite as a compromise president if the coalitions can't agree on a candidate. But Wiranto's relations with Suharto – and an expected national outcry that his candidacy would invoke – has created a dilemma.

Under President B.J. Habibie and Wiranto, reforms have begun. But although the basic objective is to remove the military from practical politics altogether, Australian expert Harold Crouch says the reform doctrine is hard to fathom. "For the most part, it doesn't add up to a new philosophy," he says. "It says the military should get out of a direct role in politics, but no one is sure where the borderline lies."

That would become a major factor if Wiranto becomes vice-president or president, but reformers are already slowing their pace because of opposition to key changes. While internal military reforms and new local autonomy laws will eventually end the practice of placing serving officers in civil-service jobs, insiders now suggest that developing a strategy to, as the generals say, "redefine, reposition and reactualize" the military could take another 10-15 years. More than 6,000 officers – mostly colonels and higher ranks – hold civilian posts, including 3,000 appointees from national and local parliaments where military representation will now fall from 15% to 10%. About 600 of those officers have elected to quit the military and stay on in the civil service and another 1,400 have accepted early pension packages.

But hundreds more could find themselves thrown out of a job prematurely by a reformist administration bent on cleaning house after the elections. And that makes the armed forces nervous. "They have their own self-serving interests of course, but a lot of generals feel it will be a waste of talent and expertise," says a Western military source. "Much of the discussion is over whether it should be done at all, let alone when it should be implemented."

Similar foot-dragging is noted elsewhere. While the military is making some effort to lower its profile in civilian affairs, it only seems to be tightening its grip on internal security by forming seven new military regions in northern Sumatra, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, and Kalimantan.

Army chief Gen. Subagyo says the move is in response to a wave of social unrest, mostly affecting Aceh, West Kalimantan, Ambon and East Timor, which exposed flaws in the army's command-and-control mechanisms. But some officers criticize the reorganization, saying it bypassed proper planning processes, provides no additional manpower and ignores the fact that the Indonesian police now have responsibility for internal security.

Indeed, with the police separated from the military chain of command since April 1, they say it would make more sense to boost the ranks of the 11,000-strong Police Mobile Brigade. Although the paramilitary force has two regiments in Jakarta to reinforce nationwide trouble spots, planners want to add a third airborne unit for more rapid deployment.

Despite the criticism, the military expects the new regional structure to be in place by 2006. Maluku and the riot-torn island of Ambon were separated from the Irian Jaya command in mid-May, and Aceh is expected to be next.

Perhaps the most intriguing feature of the reorganization is the planned division of the Nusa Tenggara island chain into two, with the existing structure responsible for Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa, and a new command being created to cover Flores, East and West Timor. Notes one Western military source: "From that, there seems to be an implicit assumption that East Timor will still be part of Indonesia" after the August 8 ballot to determine the former Portuguese enclave's future.

Maintaining separate functions for the police and military is going to be difficult for both services. "The worrying thing is taking away the army's pride," says one general. "Up to now internal security has been the army's job and it's not easy for it to detach itself from its old playground." One major sticking point will be intelligence. Handing that function over to the police, the sources acknowledge, is "something big" for an army whose lock on domestic information-gathering was a key factor in Suharto's political control.

The military has had difficulty adjusting to the changed situation on the ground since the former president's downfall. Notes a military source: "We don't have extensive experience in riot control, mainly because the armed forces have always taken their authority for granted." Not any more, judging by the length of time it took to bring the recent Ambon bloodshed under control and the deteriorating situation in Aceh.

Time and again, the military has demonstrated a lack of judgment and expertise in dealing with riots and protests, overreacting in some cases and failing to do enough in others. Experts say below-strength tear gas and poor tactics often puts demonstrators in lethal range of plastic bullets. They point out that four people died in pro-democracy street protests in South Korea between 1986 and 1988. In Jakarta last November eight students were killed in a single afternoon.

The police, for their part, have three years to get the fundamentals right and five years to develop a formal organizational structure. Building a new culture – in which the police abandon their paramilitary role and treat members of society as partners rather than enemies – will take a lot longer. Some experts estimate it will take 10-17 years for it to take hold and say they are concerned that while the police have been detached from the military, they still remain under Defence Ministry jurisdiction. Like a lot of things about Indonesia's transitional process, that's not a good place to start.