By John McBeth and Michael Vatikiotis in Jakarta – With the army's newfound support, President B.J. Habibie has a stronger chance of guiding his country along the tortuous course of political and economic reform. The following stories look at the challenges he faces, introduce the aides who have refurbished his image, and point to some powerful friends in Malaysia and Germany.
They're the new president's spin-doctors – a core group of aides who're forging B.J. Habibie's image as an accessible, warm and people-friendly leader, in stark contrast to the distant, paternalistic Suharto, his predecessor. More importantly, as Indonesia confronts difficult political and economic reform, these counsellors are quietly pushing an agenda that advances modernist Islamic goals and seeks a greater role for Indonesia's non-Javanese minority.
Many of Habibie's aides have worked with him in his earlier incarnations as research and technology minister and vice-president. Some were part of a so-called globalization team formed in early 1997 to draw up a broad framework for reform that also appears to have laid the groundwork for Habibie's eventual rise to the presidency. Indeed, Habibie supporters believe his ascendancy as vice-president – and subsequently as president – was no lucky flash in the pan. Instead, they had little doubt that their man was being groomed by Suharto to be his deputy and possible successor.
Although he has added cabinet ministers and other heavyweight aides to his coterie of advisers, Habibie continues to meet the old team regularly. "They're sort of like his political managers," notes a Jakarta-based analyst. "Before, he used to run around doing his own thing, but now he seems to be taking advice."
Given Habibie's wobbly political status, however, his advisers may need to do some nimble footwork in the future: Habibie has scheduled presidential elections for December next year – but has said publicly that he won't be a candidate. What might happen to the team in that event is still an unknown: Most of Habibie's aides themselves appear uncertain about what the longer-term future holds.
For the moment, though, their ability to push through change has been greatly enhanced by Habibie's promotion. Notes a senior Western diplomat: "Before, it was a kitchen cabinet that had no kitchen. Now they really seem to have lucked out."
Although overtaken in importance for the moment by Indonesia's economic emergency, the team's past agenda, which evolved from private discussions between Suharto and Habibie, still holds good. The agenda aimed, among other things, to promote decentralization and reform, guard the country's interests in an era of globalization, and improve links between small enterprises run by indigenous businessmen and large ones, which are usually Chinese-owned.
Habibie assembled the 70-member globalization team on instructions from then-President Suharto. An unusual collection of Muslim activists, political scientists, retired generals, businessmen, economists and diplomats, the group included some high-profile figures who later joined President Habibie's cabinet. Among the cabinet choices are Tanri Abeng, a Bakrie Group executive who now holds the portfolio for state enterprises, and Adi Sasono, secretary-general of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals, known as ICMI, who oversees state cooperatives. Many others remain for the time being in the vice-president's office.
Sasono is one of several aides drawn from ICMI, a controversial, Habibie -led organization founded in 1990 to provide a new generation of Indonesian Muslims with a channel into government. Under Suharto, that turned out to be a forlorn hope; the former president was suspicious of ICMI's diverse membership and the military had reservations about its radical tendencies. Under Habibie, the group now has an opportunity to make a difference.
Many ICMI members share family ties with the old Masyumi Party, which won nearly half the seats in the 1955 general elections. Masyumi represented a modernist strain of Islam: It was nationalist and democratic, but also attracted many non-Javanese intellectuals. The party was suppressed by former President Sukarno and wasn't revived by Suharto, his successor. Its spirit has nonetheless lived on through the urban-based organization Muhammadiyah, and now ICMI.
This suggests that beneath ICMI's somewhat disturbing rhetoric is a push for an ethnic, rather than religious, distribution of power, which rejects Suharto's emphasis on Javanese culture. Habibie's advisers reflect such thinking. "ICMI is Masyumi and Masyumi represents the struggle of the non-Javanese elite," says Nasir Tamara, senior editor of Republika, a newspaper established by ICMI.
When Habibie became vice-president in March, Lt.-Gen. Zein Maulani, now a senior aide to the president, said "people see Habibie as capable of uniting the country in a more meaningful way" because he comes from South Sulawesi, not Java. (The majority Javanese have been politically dominant in Indonesia since its independence, a fact that has created resentment in other parts of the country.)
Maulani, as well as Lt.-Gen. Sintong Panjaitan, another key Habibie aide, have the sort of diverse backgrounds that typify the new president's advisory circle. Born in the South Kalimantan river-town of Marabahan, Maulani is the highest-ranking Dayak to serve in the Indonesian military. For his part, Sintong is a Sumatran Christian, whose roller-coaster military career has included leading a brilliant anti-hijack operation in Bangkok in 1981.
Contrary to many opinions, Habibie advisers insist that their man had been Suharto's first choice for vice-president in 1993, even though military pressure forced him to appoint Gen. Try Sutrisno instead. Over the next five years, Try was given little to do other than oversee development projects and act as a ministerial coordinator. By 1997, there was little doubt among Habibie's aides that he would be Try's successor.
"We thought from the start that the globalization team was really for Habibie's vice-presidency," notes Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a Habibie adviser. "We prepared briefs for him on everything – on the political situation, on the economy, on reforms, on international issues." Adds Jimly Asshiddiqie, another long-time aide: "It was a mission given by Suharto to propose basic policies, not only in the general formulation of state guidelines, but also in reform in various fields. The initiatives not only came from Suharto, but from Habibie as well."
Yet even as early as November, Maulani predicted in a conversation with the REVIEW that Habibie would be the next vice-president. But it was to be weeks later that the ruling Golkar party disclosed Suharto wanted as his deputy someone with an intimate knowledge of science, technology and developing industries. Much to the consternation of the market, that pointed to only one contender: Habibie .
At the time, many Habibie supporters – and possibly even the man himself – appear to have been convinced that Suharto would step down in 2000, two years into his seventh term. But the economic crisis changed everything. Instead of casting his net wide for advisers, Suharto bitterly disappointed ICMI by circling the wagons following his re-election and leaving many of Habibie's allies out of his "crony cabinet." For Habibie supporters, the last straw must have been to hear Suharto voicing a lack of faith, just before he resigned, in their man's ability to be president.
Habibie, however, believes he was destined for the job. During a recent lunch with Indonesian journalists, he said that in 1974, when he returned from Germany to launch Indonesia into the technological age, Suharto mentioned the possibility that Habibie might one day become president. "If God wants it," he quoted Suharto as saying, "you will accompany me in bringing this country into the next century." As it stands now, it is likely to be a wholly different leadership at the helm in 2000 – Habibie's advisers undoubtedly hope they will be a part of it.