John McBeth, Jakarta – One of the first casualties of the post-Suharto era was the former president's ambitious son-in-law, Lt.-Gen. Prabowo Subianto. Outflanked by his boss, armed-forces chief Gen. Wiranto, Prabowo was removed from his command of Indonesia's main combat force and assigned to head a staff college in Bandung.
By all accounts, he took his demotion badly – at one point strapping on a sidearm, summoning several truckloads of troops and confronting guards at the presidential palace as he tried to win an audience with new President B.J. Habibie. He left empty-handed – but the incident may nevertheless have been the closest Indonesia came to its nightmare scenario: confrontation between military units with competing loyalties.
It was a far from graceful comedown for the fiery 47-year-old, who partly on the strength of his Suharto connections had risen rapidly to become the army's youngest three-star general. At the same time, it was a victory for Wiranto, an astute political player who doubles as defence minister.
He will need it: Complex challenges lie ahead for the armed forces, including the impact of political reform on dwifungsi, the concept that enshrines the military's role in political life. Another test may involve religious tolerance: Despite his success in heading off a dangerous rift, Wiranto was later forced into a damaging flip-flop in naming Prabowo's successor. His first choice, a Christian, was dropped amid signs that his selection had offended Muslim sensitivities.
Ever since he became armed-forces chief in late February, Wiranto had sought to check the disrupting influence of Prabowo, who is known as much for his temper as for his soldiering skills. It was no easy task, given Prabowo's backdoor access to the palace and the way Suharto liked to play one officer against another to preserve his hold over the military.
In the last hours of Suharto's presidency, however, Wiranto is believed to have won the ageing leader's approval to remove Prabowo as head of the Army Strategic Reserve, or Kostrad. Also sacked was Maj.-Gen. Muchdi Purwopranjono, who had stepped into Prabowo's old job as commander of the 6,500-strong Special Forces Regiment, Kopassus, when Prabowo was promoted to Kostrad two months ago.
Prabowo appears to have learned what was afoot late on May 20, the night before Suharto resigned. In a foretaste of the palace incident, he, Muchdi and a strong security escort turned up at the home of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Subagio to enquire about a meeting Subagio had had with Suharto earlier that evening. "It was like a raid," says a prominent official who learned of the incident from a witness. "Subagio had guests and they were really frightened." The official says the younger generals left after talking to Subagio.
Prabowo was formally relieved of his post the following morning. He then appealed directly to Suharto, who a short time earlier had read his resignation speech. According to insiders, Suharto admonished Prabowo for making trouble. Eldest daughter Siti Hardijanti Rukmana and other family members are said to have joined in the criticism. (Prabowo is married to Suharto's second daughter, Siti Hedijanti Herijadi.) Rebuffed, Prabowo later handed over his command directly to Subagio.
However, this didn't stop him making repeated efforts to see President Habibie. The sources say Prabowo went later in the day to Habibie's house in the suburb of Kuningan and asked him to reverse the transfer order and reshuffle the military leadership.
Prabowo clearly didn't get what he wanted. On the afternoon of May 22, he showed up at the presidential palace in full battle gear, armed with an automatic pistol and accompanied by "truckloads" of special forces troops, according to sources who were inside the palace. A tense verbal confrontation ensued with members of the Presidential Security Squad as Prabowo demanded to see Habibie. According to the source, Prabowo agreed to hand over his pistol in return for admission to the building. But he was later persuaded to leave – without seeing the president – by Maj.-Gen. Sintong Panjaitan, one of Habibie's military aides.
The incident triggered an alert throughout the city. Kostrad troops hastily re-erected barbed-wire barricades at the approaches to the palace complex and armoured columns were redeployed in some areas. Habibie himself moved to the state guest house adjoining his presidential office, where he remained overnight, but there were no further incidents.
During the weekend of May 23-24, Wiranto visited Prabowo at his home in Jalan Cendana, a stone's throw from Suharto's residence. What was said is not known, but family friends insist that Prabowo intends taking up his Bandung post. They also say he has denied involvement in the May 12 shooting of six students at Trisakti University and the kidnapping of pro-democracy activists – two cases in which the special forces have been mentioned as possible culprits. Prabowo couldn't be reached for comment.
For Wiranto, however, the headaches weren't over. He initially appointed Maj.-Gen. Johny Lumintang, the highly regarded assistant for operations, to replace Prabowo. But only 18 hours later, Wiranto reversed himself, moving West Java regional commander Maj.-Gen. Djamari Chaniago into the position instead. Military spokesmen later portrayed Lumintang as merely a caretaker, but it appears Wiranto came under political pressure over the fact that Lumintang is a Christian – one of only a few among top officers.
Wiranto apparently didn't want to fight that battle at this stage, despite his reputation for basing promotions solely on merit. Still, the decision could come with a cost. "Every Christian in the armed forces is going to see this as a personal affront," says a military observer.
One of Wiranto's immediate tasks is also to sort out where the military stands on political reforms. Initially, the generals said changes should be "constitutional, conceptual and gradual." But that's hardly likely to satisfy civilian leaders now. Most are impatient for the introduction of new laws governing elections and political parties as a prelude to early parliamentary and possibly presidential polls.
By taking a backseat role in Suharto's demise, the armed forces appear to have lost the initiative to proponents of a civil society, who see little room for military representation in the new parliamentary order. "I hope the military understands it will have to let go dwifungsi or otherwise reformation will be meaningless," says Mochtar Pabottingi, the architect of a political-reform blueprint now being studied by the House of Representatives. "I hope they realize the legitimacy they had is no longer there."