Rafiqa Qurrata Ayun – The acid attack on human rights activist Andrie Yunus by military personnel damaged not only his eyes but maybe also any credibility the Indonesian military (TNI) has built as a 'democratic' institution since Soeharto's downfall in 1998.
Amid calls for a thorough and credible judicial process to hold the masterminds behind the acid attack accountable, the TNI has instead engaged in political theatrics that give the public little confidence that it has any real intention of resolving the case openly and honestly.
Sham trial
The trial in a military – not civilian – tribunal of four members of the TNI's intelligence body (Badan Intelijen Strategis, BAIS) accused of perpetrating the horrific acid attack has been widely regarded as a farce.
The proceedings often seem dismissive or lacking seriousness, and at times even seem to resemble a comedy show.
The presiding judge, Colonel Chk Fredy Ferdian Isnartanto, for example, remarked during a hearing that the attack was an amateurish operation, suggesting the defendants should have 'played it smart' by wearing jackets or masks to conceal their identities.
Meanwhile, the military prosecutors (oditur) stated in their indictment (dakwaan) that the defendants' motive was personal revenge, a claim that appears bizarre, given that they did not know Andrie personally.
Civil society groups have used analysis of public CCTV footage to highlight the systematic nature of what they believe was an assassination attempt on Andrie, involving, they claim, up to 16 potential perpetrators. The military, however, has narrowed the suspects to just four and is trying them in a military tribunal rather than a civilian court, even though the crime is categorised as a 'general offence' and therefore one that could be heard in a civilian court.
Given all these problems, it is hard to believe that the trial will lead to justice. In fact, it appears such a mockery of the rule of law and civilian supremacy that it almost seems intended to demonstrate that the military is superior to civilians and beyond their reach.
While the military's tendency to arrogance and lawless conduct is hardly new, it has become more pronounced under President Prabowo Subianto. A disgraced retired general, he has increasingly positioned the military as the foundation of his political authority since being sworn in
Persistent impunity
The trial of Andrie Yunus' acid attackers has demonstrated that the military remains a strong political force, similar to what it was before reforms began in 1998, but with a different level of visibility.
There have been efforts to construct perceptions of a more humanist army that supports the community. But this does not imply that impunity has been reduced since Soeharto's New Order.
Then, the army's impunity from legal prosecution was well known. It was largely a product if its huge political influence, which allowed it excessive organisational autonomy. That autonomy allowed the military court system to handle criminal cases involving its officers, regardless of whether the crime fell under the Criminal Code (KUHP) or not.
An amended Military Law that enabled greater participation in civilian life by the army was fast-tracked in 2025. But a proposed Military Trials Bill, which would regulate the trial in the general courts of military personnel who commit crimes outside the scope of military offences, has still not been enacted.
I do not want to suggest that general courts are perfect – far from it: cases of judicial corruption still occurred in 2026, indicating ongoing issues with legal reform. Nonetheless, the evidence shows that terms of imprisonment imposed by military courts are frequently much shorter than those imposed by the general courts, suggesting a significant degree of impunity when the military judge their own.
The trial of Yunus' accused attackers seems to serve the public interest by providing a relatively swift hearing, and some may see it as relatively open and, at first glance, following legal procedures. But, in reality, it seems to have served primarily as a symbolic gesture of formality rather than an effort to deliver true justice.
Entrenched militarism
In other words, the military trial of Andrie Yunus' acid attackers echoes the authoritarian past.
The 32 years of Soeharto's rule, backed by the army, entrenched its influence in politics. Various efforts since the 1998 reform have sought to push the army to step back from formal politics and civilian roles, especially under the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) (1999-2001). These included the separation of the police and the military and the formal revocation of the army's 'dual function' (dwifungsi) and its guaranteed political role.
Another presidency that perhaps served as a brief honeymoon for civilian supremacy was that of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), who sought to establish greater civilian governance despite his own military background. However, this still did not reverse entrenched militarism.
In fact, the strong influence of armed forces was accentuated under the administration of Joko Widodo (Jokowi), as demonstrated by the appointment of a retired army general, Ryamizard Ryacudu, as Defence Minister, followed by Prabowo Subianto. Until then, the position had been held by civilian appointees since the end of 199 [original text missing] (with the sole exception of Agum Gumelar, who held the position for just three days in 2001).
Throughout Jokowi's second term, the military were explicitly tasked with securing problematic projects, such as the Food Estate program, and their influence grew rapidly across the country.
Following his election, Prabowo solidified his alliance with the military, as evidenced by the 2025 amendment to the Military Law, mentioned earlier. This legislation reinforced the military's continued involvement in civilian affairs, consistent with regulations established under various other laws during Jokowi's time in office.
Why TNI reform fails
Many have noted that Andrie's activism within KontraS and his organisation's strong opposition to militarism in Indonesia seem to have unsettled the military, which, on this analysis, subsequently responded with an acid attack to silence him.
But Andrie's case also reflects the wider problem of the limited nature of security sector reform, including military justice reform – soldiers still seem to enjoy a high degree of impunity when they commit criminal offences.
The farcical trial of Andrie's attackers, thus, reflects not only the military's lack of professionalism but also the weakness of civil society in challenging militarism. There now seems to be no progressive political force capable of pushing for, let alone ensuring, civilian supremacy and the professionalisation of military institutions.
Instead, security sector reforms focus on institutional changes and legal advocacy, but this approach is often inadequate. This has led many reformers to rely on the police as a coercive institution to counter potential anti-democratic threats from the military. But these efforts have also failed, as the police are, in many ways, equally problematic, as shown by a series of documented violent incidents and the problems that arise when they manage state projects, such as free meal programs.
Building a strong progressive political force is crucial to preventing military involvement in politics, ensuring military professionalism and fostering a transparent, accountable judiciary. Without it, civil society will face persistent intimidation, and the rule of law will continue to be disregarded.