Max Lane – Indonesia's civil society and university campuses have long been a bellwether for military overreach. The current mood among resistors is distinctly anxious.
Protests and statements of concern over the last several weeks regarding the Indonesian Armed Forces' (TNI) activities reveal a deep fear of a return of the military to politics, especially within Indonesia's civil society sector. The protests reflect a fear of what might happen, that the role the military had during the New Order might recur. During Suharto's New Order (1965-1998), an official dogma conferred on the armed forces was that of 'dual function' (dwifungsi). Although the New Order ended 27 years ago, the memory of military rule remains strong in Indonesian political life.
This fear stems from what happened during the New Order, especially in its last two years. First, through an armed forces' reorganisation in 1985, a structure known as the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB), later renamed the Indonesian Coordinating Body for the Assistance of Improving National Stability (BAKORSTANAS), allowed the army to act as the government's primary weapon of political control and repression. A second feature was the direct involvement of armed forces institutions in business while the armed forces had representatives in the 'rubber stamp' parliament. After Suharto's fall, the military conceded to the opposition movement, dwifungsi was renounced and its institutions withdrew from political control activity, except in western Papua. The military agreed with then President Abdurrahman Wahid to renounce dwifungsi in 2000 but the abolition was to be done fully after the 2004 elections.
At the same time, the issue of ongoing impunity for any military violation of human rights during the New Order or in western Papua now sustains civilian suspicion of the military: "Impunitas" (impunity) has entered the civil society lexicon for over ten years now.
The rise of this fear has been triggered by events coinciding over the past year and more. First was the election of Prabowo Subianto as president last February. For those involved in human rights organisations and campaigns, he embodies the military's role in politics during the New Order. A former son-in-law of Suharto, Prabowo rose to be head of the special forces (KOPASSUS) and was involved in military operations in what was then Indonesia's Papua and East Timor provinces. Most vividly for the human rights sector and student politics, Prabowo is viewed as a military officer who used violence against the student movement in 1997 and 1998, when opposition to Suharto peaked. Prabowo is alleged to have been in command of the 'Rose Team' (Tim Mawar) that kidnapped activists in late 1997 and 1998. Some victims gave evidence that they were tortured. Fourteen activists, including the famed activist poet, Wiji Thukul, disappeared and are presumed to have been murdered. Prabowo was also alleged to have been involved in stirring up rioting in 1998, some of which violently targeted the Chinese community. Prabowo was investigated for violations of the military code in relation to these events. He was apparently dismissed from the Army, although this is disputed. While none of these allegations have been proven in a court of law and Prabowo has denied them, this perception is deeply embedded in activist civil society and much of the student movement. Thus, Prabowo's 2024 election and assumption of power were perceived as the potential start of a Suharto-era style military comeback.
Over the last few months, these fears have been exacerbated by other events. Probably the one which provoked the strongest response was Parliament's revisions to the Law on the Indonesian Armed Forces (UU TNI). There are two primary matters related to this that strengthened the triggering effect for the fear of a TNI comeback. First, the Law was revised to expand the number of non-military institutions to which armed forces personnel could be seconded. Second, parliamentary discussion of the bill was held in closed sessions, protected by guards and finished quickly, giving the impression that there was something to hide. While the Law does not reconstitute repressive mechanisms such as KOPKAMTIB, this seemingly rushed and secretive process of expanding the armed forces' role was enough to ignite fears. Angry demonstrations continued over several days, with some physical clashes.
While these demonstrations never grew to the size of those against the Job Creation Law or the Corruption Eradication Law during Widodo's presidency, the sentiment manifesting the fear of a TNI comeback to power has become widespread. This is echoed in the media and among academics. There have been protests organised from among the growing body of Indonesian postgraduates, who are the next generation of teachers and experts studying abroad – this is a new phenomenon.
On the back of larger demonstrations against corruption, dynastic politics, and Prabowo's austerity drive, under the slogan "Indonesia Gelap", the concern has become palpable. The Indonesia Gelap sentiment overlaps with criticisms of an increased role for the army – sometimes criticised as 'multifungsi' (multi-function) – which has been reinforced by the increased presence of former military associates of Prabowo being appointed to important positions in government and government-owned businesses.
During March and into April, the fear deepened, with reports of increased military presence and intervention on campuses. The media have carried reports of TNI officers and other soldiers appearing on campuses, sometimes uninvited and at other times under 'memoranda of understanding' between local military commands and the universities, to ask for protest organisers' or speakers' names and addresses. Kompas has named seven locations, including Universitas Indonesia, where such incidents occurred. A member of Parliament's Commission X (on education, youth and other matters) from the opposition Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Bonnie Triyana, strongly criticised this presence.
Military spokespersons deny any interest in having a political presence on campuses and no one has been arrested thus far. Prabowo has stated that the TNI has no interest in reviving dwifungsi. On 21 April 2025, the State Secretary told the press that he would investigate the context for the TNI's presence on campuses.
Distrust in military intentions is strong among the educated middle class, activist civil society and the universities today. As Prabowo is likely to continue to rely on close military associates to hold important positions, it is hard to see this distrust lessening. Reports of the TNI's presence on campuses may indicate that although there has been no central instruction to carry out harassment, the military's sense of impunity may mean that such harassment will increase. It is probable that if there is no holding to account of the military personnel involved in abuses in 1965-1998 and in Papua, it will be impossible for the distrust to go away. This distrust must be seen as serious and palpable in Indonesia's ongoing political life.
[Max Lane is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He has been an academic at the University of Sydney, Victoria University (Melbourne), Murdoch University and the National University of Singapore and has lectured at universities in Southeast Asia, Europe and the United States.]
Source: https://fulcrum.sg/fear-of-military-interference-in-politics-runs-deep-in-indonesia