Iim Halimatusa'diyah and Panarat Anamwathana – Compared to young people in other Southeast Asian countries, Thai and Indonesian undergraduates are the most wary of potential military influence over their countries' politics and their own lives.

Although later debunked as a hoax, a fake statement attributed to Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto on compulsory military service disseminated online in November 2024 has sparked a broader public debate about the military's role in politics.

Prabowo previously announced the expansion of the Reserve Component (Komcad), a civilian reservist force designed to support and strengthen Indonesia's National Armed Forces (TNI). He also plans to increase the number of Regional Military Commands (Kodam), raising concerns about the potential resurgence of the Suharto-era military's 'dual function' (dwifungsi) where active officers hold positions in defence and politics.

Some of the fears surrounding the Indonesian military's expanded role have arguably already materialised in Thailand. Since 1954, military service for male citizens has been mandatory in Thailand, giving the armed forces significant influence over young men and the opportunity to indoctrinate them with military values and nationalist ideology. Despite Thailand having a civilian government since 2023, the military still holds considerable power and maintains a significant role in politics.

These trends exist as young people in Southeast Asia today, particularly in Indonesia and Thailand, are expressing growing discontent with their respective country's armed forces and apparent attempts to expand military influence in governance and government. A survey conducted from August to October 2024 by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute revealed that compared to their peers, Thai and Indonesian undergraduates exhibited the highest levels of opposition to increasing military influence in society and politics. The survey polled 3,081 undergraduates from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam; of these, 529 were Indonesian and 501 were Thai. The respondents were asked if they agreed with mandatory military service (or conscription, Figure 1) and increased funding to the military (Figure 2).

Figure 1. Southeast Asian Youth's Views: Should Military Service Be Mandatory? (see original document)

Note: Respondents were asked for their attitude towards the statement, "Military service should be mandatory". They answered on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = Strongly disagree and 5 = Strongly agree, and Don't Know/No Answer was an accepted response. Source - ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Youth and Civic Engagement in Southeast Asia Survey, 2024

On whether military service should be mandatory, Thai respondents expressed the highest level of disagreement (59.68 per cent), while Indonesian youth respondents showed the second-highest level of disagreement (36.67 per cent). The Thai undergraduate respondents' strong opposition is notable, given that Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore have compulsory military service, but respondents from Vietnam and Singapore reported the lowest levels of disagreement (14.39 per cent and 17.86 per cent, respectively) with the same statement.

Figure 2. Southeast Asian Youth's Views: Should Military Funding Be Increased? (see original document)

Note: Respondents were asked for their attitude towards the statement, "Military service should be mandatory". They answered on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = Strongly disagree and 5 = Strongly agree, and Don't Know/No Answer was an accepted response. Source - ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Youth and Civic Engagement in Southeast Asia Survey, 2024

When asked about whether funding to their country's military should be increased, 38.52 per cent of Thai respondents and 23.44 per cent of Indonesian respondents expressed strong opposition, again representing the highest levels of disapproval in the survey. (The proportions of youth disagreement in the other four countries surveyed ranged from 10 to 17 per cent.)

While imperfect, these two indicators can arguably serve as proxies for undergraduates' opposition to the military's role in politics for several reasons. First, opposition to mandatory military service signals resistance to any potential increase in the military's influence over civilian life. Drafts or conscription directly affect a country's young people, especially males. Second, students' disagreement with increasing military funding perhaps reflects their concerns over the financial burden it places on taxpayers (their parents or themselves), and perhaps a fear of enabling the military to further entrench its influence in government. Given Thailand and Indonesia's complex and recent histories of military involvement in politics, it is unsurprising that these collective experiences have fostered broader scepticism among their youth about the proper role the military should play, if any, in a country's politics.

Indeed, Thailand's military has long been entrenched in political affairs, with the country experiencing 14 coups since 1932. The most recent, in 2014, was led by former general Prayut Chan-o-cha, who remained in power for nearly a decade, prompting the 2020-2021 youth-led pro-democracy rallies. These protests demanded military reforms to curb the Thai military's political influence. This recent experience most likely explains the Thai undergraduate respondents' opposition to increasing the military budget and conscription, as they likely view conscription as further reinforcing military dominance over civilian affairs.

Concerns over military influence resurfaced during Thailand's 2019 and 2023 general elections when several parties such as Move Forward (MFP) (now dissolved) and Pheu Thai (PT) proposed reforms, including abolishing mandatory military service. However, these reforms are unlikely to materialise now that PT has formed a coalition with several pro-military parties. The present government's close ties with the military are evident in the passing of "symbolic" military reforms, an increase in the defence budget despite opposition criticism, and the withdrawal of an anti-coup d'etat bill in December 2024. While this has divided Thailand's youth movement – the ISEAS survey results nevertheless suggest that more than half of Thai undergraduates remain wary of the military.

Similarly, Indonesia's military has a longstanding history of political involvement. Since the enactment of the dual function (dwifungsi) in 1969 under then-president Suharto's New Order, the military has maintained a dominant role in politics at local, provincial and national levels. During Suharto's time, civilians had a minimal role in government, undermining Indonesia's path to democracy. The military's involvement in politics also stymied transparency and accountability. Even post-reform, active military officers have occupied certain civilian positions in the Yudhoyono and Widodo presidencies, and President Prabowo has expanded this trend, further reinforcing public concerns about the return of dwifungsi.

That said, while Thai and Indonesian youth strongly oppose military influence in their respective societies, a higher proportion of Indonesian youth support the military's role in society (30.62 and 35.54 per cent agree with conscription and increased military spending, respectively) compared to their Thai counterparts (18.36 and 31.74 per cent, respectively). This difference can be traced to their contrasting experiences with military involvement in politics: Thai youth have been directly affected by military intervention in politics, witnessing the 2014 coup d'etat, Prayut's time in power, and the junta-appointed Senate blocking the winner of the 2023 election. Though Thailand currently has a civilian government, the powerful and highly autonomous military looms in the background. In contrast, Indonesian youth – especially those born after the end of the Suharto era – have not experienced military dominance in the same way. Nevertheless, young Indonesians and Thais are similar in their desire to limit the military's influence, advocating that active soldiers and generals remain strictly in the barracks.

[Iim Halimatusa'diyah is a Visiting Fellow in the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, a Senior Lecturer at Islamic State University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah, and a Deputy Director for Research at the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta. Panarat Anamwathana is a Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. She is also a lecturer at the Faculty of Liberal Arts at Thammasat University in Thailand.]

Source: https://fulcrum.sg/why-thai-and-indonesian-youth-oppose-increasing-military-influence-in-society