David Camroux and Mahrus Harnadi – On 7 January 2024, the second debate in the presidential election campaign in Indonesia was held. The debate's theme was Indonesia's position in international affairs and involved three candidates – front-runner and ultimate victor, Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto, Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo.

Not only did none of the candidates refer to the 'Indo-Pacific' during the debates, even ASEAN received only a cursory mention. The term 'Indo-Pacific' was entirely absent in the campaign platforms of the three candidates. This would seem to confirm that less than five years after Indonesia played a significant role as a norm entrepreneur in the drafting of the 'ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific' (AOIP), the Outlook no longer has importance in Indonesia's foreign policy and will have even less salience under the forthcoming Prabowo administration.

This does not preclude requiring external powers to give a token nod to the AOIP. Rather like 'ASEAN centrality', the AOIP is one of those totems to be acknowledged occasionally with a cursory bow and then ignored. But unlike 'ASEAN centrality', it has no operational consequences in the diplomatic behaviour of ASEAN member states.

Some five years after the publication of the AOIP, it seems to have become irrelevant. The Chair's statements of the ASEAN Summits held since June 2019 mention the AOIP only at the very end, expressing the aspirational goal that external powers should aspire to its principles. The statements underline the importance of existing ASEAN-centred fora – meetings with dialogue partners, ASEAN Plus Three and, above all, the East Asia Summit – as the regional political space within which ASEAN seeks to function.

For ASEAN political elites, the fundamental problem of the Indo-Pacific concept is that it is essentially geopolitical, as opposed to the notion of the Asia Pacific, which has largely been conceived of in geoeconomic terms. After the Asia Pacific trope was given concrete expression in the 1989 creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Forum, ASEAN countries not only took a degree of ownership but also, under Indonesian leadership, created parallel institutional bodies. These bodies include the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

To date, no institutional ASEAN counterweight to the Indo-Pacific has been proposed. In Jakarta, as in Hanoi and Manila, the future would appear to lie in pursing nationalistic rather than regional arrangements with the main actors of the Indo-Pacific, rather than an ASEAN-inspired institutional initiative.

As the largest ASEAN member state, Indonesia's stance significantly influences the region. Should Indonesia decide that its ASEAN membership is no longer a cornerstone of its diplomacy, it would likely signal to regional partners to shift their focus towards bilateral or minilateral arrangements rather than ASEAN-centred regional initiatives. This shift could exacerbate divisions within ASEAN, with US security partners like the Philippines and Singapore on the one side and China's close partners such as Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia on the other.

All indications are that the incoming Prabowo administration will continue to treat the AOIP with minimal attention. In his somewhat quixotic speech at the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue, Prabowo promoted Indonesia as a peacemaker both in Ukraine and Gaza. This speech did not mention ASEAN or the Indo-Pacific, let alone Asian regional security. Nevertheless, Prabowo's official visits to China and Japan shortly after being confirmed as president-elect seemed to indicate a continuation of Indonesia's balancing bilateral strategy with its giant northern neighbours, irrespective of its status as a member of ASEAN.

In that sense, Prabowo's style resembles that of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, known for his affection for the international stage. Like Yudhoyono, Prabowo is a well-travelled army general who was educated abroad. Yudhoyono distanced Indonesia from ASEAN, with some advisers even advocating for a 'post-ASEAN foreign policy' for Indonesia.

In a first for an Indonesian president elect, Prabowo has conducted over a dozen overseas trips since February, the most significant being to China, Japan, Russia, Jordan, Turkey and France. As suggested in The Jakarta Post, this is in the spirit of Indonesia's first vice president Mohammad Hatta's 'free and active' foreign policy. This foreign policy was forged in a Cold War-era world where ASEAN did not yet exist and where Indonesia, in initiating the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, first emerged as a global actor.

Prabowo's apparent disdain for the consensual and lethargic 'ASEAN way' of decision-making could well continue into his presidency. This disdain has some foundations. Jakarta has seen its fellow ASEAN members thwart Timor Leste's application for ASEAN membership despite strong support from Jakarta. After some efforts during its ASEAN presidency in 2021 to make ASEAN central in ending the brutal conflict in Myanmar, Jakarta no longer has any illusions about its ability to do so.

With ASEAN centrality now seemingly challenged, the AOIP is likely to lose even the minimal momentum it had in the first place. A future Prabowo administration is expected to prioritise domestic economic development and to promote Indonesia internationally as a globally focused middle-income country. Indonesia's pending application to join the OECD and its reticence to join the BRICS are symptomatic of Indonesia's current foreign relations thrust.

[David Camroux is honorary senior research fellow and adjunct professor at the Centre for International Studies (CERI) Sciences Po. He is also Co-coordinator of the Franco-German Observatory of the Indo-Pacific. Mahrus Harnadi holds a master's degree from Sciences Po.]

Source: https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/08/09/prabowos-pivot-away-from-asean-and-the-indo-pacific