This Report presents the results of the two and a half years of work by the world's first bilateral Truth and Friendship Commission. It is comprised of nine chapters.

I. Mandate and implementation

The Commission's mandate began in 2005 and was extended until 2008 to complete the three main components of its work: (l) inquiry, consisting of document review, fact-finding, and research, (2) making findings on the perpetration of gross human rights violations and institutional responsibility, and (3) arriving at recommendation and lessons learned.

II. The "Conclusive Truth"

There were multiple causes of the conflict in 1999, which are complex and interrelated. Some of these causes doubtless go back to at least 1974 and the events ensuing from the end of the Portuguese colonial presence. Others arose from the more immediate political context of the events of 1998 in Indonesia. The underlying reasons for each aspect of the conflict in 1999 requires further, specialized research in order to fully understand why the conflict happened in specific ways, and how various institutions and individuals participated.

First, the events of 1999 cannot be understood in isolation from the long period of conflict that occurred in East Timor. The nature of the violence that occurred in 1999 was shaped by previous patterns of conflict.

Second, the violence that occurred in East Timor in 1999 also grew out of the unique political circumstances that were created by Indonesia's transition from an authoritarian to a democratic state (Reformasi), which began in 1998.

Third, although in 1999 ABRI was intent on initiating internal reforms to transform itself by stages into a professional military force with particular focus on the external defense function, in early 1999 the political and social dynamics and security defense were still strongly influenced by the legacy of the past.

Finally, the institutional actions that led to violence in 1999 represent the culmination of the actions of those individuals taking part in the violence. However, determining individual responsibility is not the mandated task of this Commission.

Conclusions about Gross Human Rights Violations and Institutional Responsibility

1. The Commission concluded that gross human rights violations in the form of crimes against humanity did occur in East Timor in 1999 and that these violations included murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, illegal detention, and forcible transfer and deportation carried out against the civilian population.

2. The Commission concluded that there was institutional responsibility for these violations.

3. The Commission concluded that pro-autonomy militia groups, TNI, the Indonesian civilian government, and Polri must all bear institutional responsibility for gross human rights violations targeted against civilians perceived as supporting the proindependence cause. These crimes included murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, illegal detention, and illegal detention, and forcible transfer and deportation.

4. The Commission concluded that because of the lack of previous systematic judicial investigations of such violations the exact nature and extent of such violations could not be conclusively determined.

5. The Commission concluded that persistent patterns of organized, institutional involvement in these gross human rights violations provide the basis for its conclusions about institutional responsibility.

How the Commission arrived at these conclusions

A. Conclusions about gross human rights violations

The Commission received a very large volume of documentary, and live, testimonial evidence that gross human rights violations occurred. All of the four major bodies of documents examined in the Document Review agreed that gross human rights violations were perpetrated in East Timor in 1999.

On the basis of its review of all of the evidence, the Commission identified specific cases of gross human rights violations, and determined that there were in fact persistent patterns of organized, systematic violations perpetrated by members or elements of pro-autonomy groups and Indonesian governmental institutions.

B. Conclusions about institutional responsibility

To find institutional responsibility the Commission analyzed whether there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the patterns of widespread and/or systematic violations manifested institutional involvement of sufficient scope and duration to justify conclusions of institutional responsibility on the part of several institutions that played a role in the violence in 1999.

On the basis of its analysis, the Commission concluded that the evidence clearly proved that pro-autonomy militias were the primary direct perpetrators of gross human rights violations in East Timor in 1999.

In analyzing the extent to which Indonesian institutions also met the criteria for institutional responsibility, the Commission concluded that the evidence was sufficiently clear and abundant to justify such conclusions. More specifically, the Commission found that TNI personnel, police, and civilian authorities consistently and systematically cooperated with and supported the militias in a number of significant ways that contributed to the perpetration of the crimes enumerated above. The evidence also demonstrated that TNI personnel sometimes directly participated in the operations that led to these crimes.

The commission also found that there was abundant evidence that showed the activities of militia groups were also supported by the civilian government in a variety of ways.

III. The Commission's recommendations

The Recommendations respond to the Commission's mandate, the lessons learned, as well as to tangible problems that currently face each country as a result of the violence in 1999. Above all, they are a response to the needs of those whose lives were affected by the violence in 1999.

The mandate authorizes the Commission to make specific recommendations, inter alia, regarding amnesty and rehabilitation. The mandate also asks the Commission to make recommendations that include innovative ways to improve people-to-people relationships in the two countries that are in congruence with local religious beliefs and customs, and to solidify cooperative and reconciliatory processes at the state level.

In addressing these guidelines of its mandate, the Commission aimed to provide realistic and concrete recommendations that are inclusive, forward-looking, based on principles of restorative justice, and which would promote long term friendship, reconciliation and the prevention of future conflicts and violence.

In addition, in preparing its recommendations, the Commission took into account the institutional shortcomings and failures that it had identified as having contributed to the 1999 violence. Remedying systemic and institutional failures through institutional reform is necessary to prevent future reoccurrences of violence and to ensure the foundation for peace and friendship between the two countries.

In fulfilling its mandate the Commission followed two key principles in formulating recommendations. The Commission determined that in order to promote reconciliation recommendations must be inclusive, and must not discriminate between parties, particularly based on political affiliation. The second principle informing the recommendation is that they all take the form of collective reparations, requiring material and other forms of support from the relevant governments and institutions.

The Commission's recommendations for urgent action may be summarized under several themes.

- Recommendations focusing on accountability and institutional reform.

The Commission does not recommend amnesty or rehabilitation for any persons.

A key component of such institutional reforms is a culture of accountability in the institutions whose responsibility it is to maintain peace a security and to prevent and punish violations of law and human rights. Based upon this principle and in accordance with its Terms of Reference and considerations of procedural justice, the Commission made no recommendations for amnesty or rehabilitation of any individuals or groups.

The Commission's Report identifies weak judicial institutions, the lack of an effective commitment to the rule of law, and the lack of accountability in military and security forces, as factors that contributed to the violence of 1999.

On the basis of its reflections on these conclusions and the underlying events, the Commission recommended a series of urgent institutional reform including:

A human rights training program focused specifically on the role of security forces and intelligence organizations in situations of political conflict, mass demonstrations and civil unrest and emphasizing the obligation of the military and intelligence forces to remain neutral in political controversies and elections, to refrain from using state resources in support of political parties or their goals, and to operate solely within the limits of the law and under the direction of civilian leadership.

A human rights training program focused specifically on the role of particular civil institutions in planning for and working to prevent situations of civil and political conflict through mediation, peaceful method of conflict resolution, and the inculcation of a culture of understanding and toleration of political difference, and of the right of citizens to express their differences without fear or intimidation within all levels of the civilian government.

The promotion of institutional reforms that enhance the authority and effectiveness of institutions or agencies charged with the investigation and prosecution of human rights violations alleged to have been perpetrated by members of the armed forces, police or other security agencies.

Specialized training programs for military, police, and civilian officials to promote the protection of women and children and the prevention of sexual exploitation and violence in all forms against women, and other vulnerable populations.

The Commission's findings and conclusions in regard to the nature and causes of the violence in 1999 underscores the importance of institutional reform that will lead to a clearer understanding of the role of a professional military operating in a democratic state solely under the control and authority of the elected civilian government.

On this basis the Commission makes a series of recommendations aimed at preventing recurrence of the kind of violence that occurred in 1999 through a transformation of military doctrine and institutional practices and mentalities from that of a freedom fighting or revolutionary people's army to the kind of professional armed forces appropriate for a modern, democratic state operating under the rule of law and civilian control.

- Recommendations involving joint border and security policy.

Unresolved border and security issues represent an ongoing impediment to achieving peace and friendship between the two nations and to addressing the needs of those individuals whose lives have been adversely affected by the violence in 1999. To resolve these issues the Commission recommended the following urgent measures:

The governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste establish visa-free "Peace "Zones," already informally in existence, on the border between Timor-Leste and West Timor. The establishment or an official Peace Zone(s) will bring legitimacy to these activities and expand the possibility for further widespread bilateral communications, cultural exchanges, and economic development, particularly through the creation of a free trade zone within the Peace Zone(s).

Increasing security on the border zone between the two countries through a mechanism of field cooperation, coordination and training involving joint patrols and joint border posts.

The completion of agreements related to land, sea and air border demarcation and delimitation between the two countries, that have not yet been fully agreed.

- Recommendations to promote conflict resolution and provide psychosocial services for victims.

The Commission recommends the establishment of a Documentation and Conflict Resolution Center tasked with promoting understanding of the past between the peoples of the two nations, providing educational and training programs in conflict resolution and mediation for government, civil society, communities, and educational curricula.

- Recommendations involving economic and asset issues

The Commission recommends the two governments to accelerate the resolution of the complex economic and asset issues including the disposition of public and private assets, addressing unresolved pensions for former civil servants and other related issues.

- Recommendation for Commission for Disappeared Persons.

The Commission recommends that the governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste work together to acquire information/form a commission about disappeared people and cooperate to gather data and provide information. This Commission shall also be tasked to identify the whereabouts of all Timor Leste children who were separated from their parents and to notify their families.

- Recommendation for acknowledgment.

Commission recommends for official acknowledgment through expressions of regret and apology for the suffering caused by the violence in 1999 and a firm commitment to take all necessary measures to prevent reoccurrence of such events and to heal the wounds of the past.

- Long-term and aspirational recommendations.

The Commission made several recommendations that are more general in nature and aim at promoting long term friendship and reconciliation between the peoples of the two nations. They include, cultural and educational exchanges, cooperation and support in the health sector, promoting a wider culture of peace and respect for the rule of law and human rights, continuing security cooperation and bilateral programs in respecting and caring for the remains of the deceased in each country, and consideration of options regarding dual citizenship.

The Commission's recommendations and spirit of truth are a sound basis to further develop the ties between Indonesia and East Timor. Symbolically and through the tangible results of the Commission's work, the two countries have already joined together to face a difficult past, and have promised to take a positive approach to the future.