Bruce Haigh – For as long as the Indonesian army administers West Papua, abuses will occur toward the indigenous Papuan population. The raison d'etre of the military is to hold the archipelago together – an archipelago inherited by the Javanese from the Dutch after a guerilla war. The Indonesian Republic came into being on December 27, 1949. West New Guinea as it was known remained with the Dutch. Indonesia pressed the Dutch to hand over West New Guinea, including the threat of force.

The hand-over from Dutch to Indonesian administration occurred in 1963. It was the same year as Indonesia's President Sukarno launched a program of confrontation (Konfrontasi) against the new Malaysian Federation.

Australian troops were deployed in support of Malaysia, and as a result found themselves in action against Indonesian troops in Borneo. That was 42 years ago. In 1969, a UN supervised Act of Free Choice was held to determine if the Papuans wanted independence or incorporation into the Indonesian Republic. The Indonesians hand-picked Papuan delegates who agreed to incorporation. The basic tension in the relationship between Australia and Indonesia over the past 42 years has been the Indonesian army and its role in the region, particularly with respect to maintaining control of the archipelago.

After the collapse of the Suharto regime in late 1997, the military was forced to accept a reduction in power and influence. Elections were held which on the face of it further reduced the power of the military. But in fact the reduction in power was only in terms of the ease of direct and immediate access to civilian politicians in Jakarta. The role and prestige of the military in holding the archipelago together remained unchallenged.

Then came East Timor. The elected civilians in Jakarta undermined the military – indeed humiliated the military through the terms negotiated over the exit of East Timor from the republic.

However, it was easier for the military to blame Australia for its interventionist role than to get stuck into Indonesian politicians who had decided to quit East Timor. The military has not given up its blueprint to regain East Timor, and nor its desire to hang on to West Papua despite the limited nature of the claims of the Indonesians over the territory.

The Indonesian army administers the archipelago with an iron fist. It does not tolerate dissent and has an economic imperative for maintaining tight control. If John Howard wants to bring about change in West Papua he must address himself to the Indonesian army, not the Indonesian Government.

The politics of Indonesia are that the civilian politicians of Jakarta can't change or influence a thing in West Papua. It is a military-controlled province. The government of Indonesia exercises little power or authority outside Jakarta. Whatever authority or power it enjoys in the provinces is at the discretion and interpretation of the army.

The protest coming out of Jakarta at the moment from Indonesian politicians and commentators is directed as much at the military as it is at Australia. They have to appear tough in order to try and influence the army to take them seriously while at the same time seeking to pass a message to the army to soften the brutal administration of West Papua in order to avoid international scrutiny that might force another, and this time properly conducted, Act of Free Choice.

The Government in Jakarta has little leverage over the army. For some time the army has been applying pressure on the Government to increase their power to the level they enjoyed under Suharto. Whether they achieve this by undermining elected representation to the point of rendering it ineffectual or by engineering the collapse of the electoral process does not overly concern them. The aim of the army is to directly control the affairs of Indonesia and to have control over policy.

If John Howard and Alexander Downer want to reduce tension in West Papua they must address themselves to the army. For it is the army that runs and controls West Papua.

Its indigenous population do not believe they are part of Indonesia. They believe they were tricked by the Act of Free Choice into giving up their sovereignty. Every day of brutal and oppressive administration by the Indonesian army only reinforces that belief. The continued suffering of the West Papuans increases the prospect of civil war and refugees.

If Howard and Downer are to develop a relationship with Indonesia that has a measure of strength and durability, they should learn from the mistakes of Whitlam, Hawke, Keating and Evans. They must talk directly. They must highlight, address and discuss the problems as they see them with the government and the army. They must not talk out of both sides of the mouth. The must not sweep the problem of West Papua under the carpet where it will only fester. They must not bend to the old Jakarta appeasement lobby in Australia.

[Bruce Haigh is a retired Australian diplomat who served in north and south Asia and the Middle East.He was also director of the Indonesia section of DFAT. He has written a book on Indonesian/Australian relations, The Great Australia Blight, and another on regional defence, Pillars of Fear. He is also a former soldier and now farms near Mudgee, NSW.]