J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Jakarta – Scanning the print media around March 11, it was clear that few, if any, remembered, or perhaps most just ignored or could not care less, what happened on March 11 in 1966. During the 32 years of the New Order regime under Soeharto, March 11 was regarded as sacred.
Several important national occasions were later held on that date, such as the beginning session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the supreme governing body of the republic, according to the 1945 Constitution, until the onset of the "era of reform" after the resignation of Soeharto in 1998.
March 11, 1966, was a turning point in Indonesia's history. It was the day the late president Sukarno issued an order, later known as Supersemar (Surat Perintah 11 Maret, or the March 11 Order) to Soeharto, then a major general.
The primary significance of the Supersemar is that it was used by Soeharto as the basis of the establishment of what he called "The New Order" to replace the "Old Order", which referred to the era of "Guided Democracy" under Sukarno.
The rationale for the change, as Soeharto stated in his first "State of the Union Address" as acting president in 1967, was that Sukarno's Old Order had been a deviation and betrayal of the 1945 Constitution, particularly the ideology of Pancasila (five principles) embodied in its Preamble, and Soeharto's New Order was meant to be a "total correction" of that deviation, for his New Order would be based on a "pure and consistent" implementation of Pancasila, whatever that meant.
Yet, Supersemar has been full of mystery. Until now nobody knows, perhaps except Soeharto himself, where the original order is. Three generals – Basuki Rachmat, Amir Mahmud and M. Yusuf, all dead now, were Soeharto's messengers to see Sukarno in Bogor to receive the order. The first died in 1967 of a heart attack. The other two died much later, both taking the secret to their graves.
Some time after the resignation of Soeharto in 1998, however, a TV station rebroadcast Sukarno's speech about the March 11 order. This proved the existence of Supersemar. The most important part of Sukarno's usual fiery speech was his emphasis that the March 11 order was "not a transfer of authority". In fact, he said "poverty" instead of "authority", but he immediately corrected his slip of the tongue.
In other words, Soeharto clearly interpreted the order to his own advantage, in the interest of power. That interpretation was sustained by having Supersemar firmly entrenched in a decision by the powerful MPR (then the provisional MPRS), especially considering that the 1945 Constitution provided no mechanisms for judicial reviews or the separation of powers with an effective system of checks and balances. Indeed, in the face of a student demonstration (if I remember correctly, against the Taman Mini Indonesia Indah project in 1972), Soeharto threatened to use the power of supersemar.
A huge number of articles and books have been published over the years since the Gestapu, the Indonesian acronym for the "September 30 Movement". Scholars and journalists across the world have analyzed and attempted to understand the Gestapu, its aims, the forces behind it, and other aspects. Yet so many questions remain to be answered, and perhaps will remain unanswered.
From the dozens of books and articles that I have perused over the years, perhaps all I can say is some may be closer to the truth than others. After all, the "truth" of an affair such as the Gestapu may be too complex to understand completely. Using an article by W.F. Wertheim, Soeharto and the Untung Coup: The missing link in Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 1 and 2, winter 1970, as a starting point for her analysis, a PhD thesis later published by Nawaz B Mody of Bombay University, Indonesia under Soeharto (1987) is probably, I believe, as close to the truth as anyone has gotten.
Yet what is the "truth" of anything, anyway? What sounds logical, coherent and sensible may not be true, while what is true may not sound logical, coherent and sensible, particularly in the circumstances prevailing in Indonesia at the time of the complex Gestapu affair.
One of the most recent books was by Antonie C.A. Dake, Berkas-berkas Soekarno 1965-1967, Kronologi Suatu Keruntuhan (2005), which while using a large number of ideas and facts from lots of largely secondary sources, does not come to any conclusion. Yet all the ideas and facts may help change previous conclusions, which may in the end result in a better understanding of what happened around the Gestapu in 1965.
First, the Gestapu was not really a coup d'etat, because Sukarno, a dictatorial ruler, remained in control. It was ridiculous that for some time he was suspected of being involved in the "coup d'etat". It was, indeed, a struggle for power, involving not just two, but at least three "centers of powers": Sukarno, the Army, or particularly a group of Army generals, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
There might have been a fourth "center" of power, a question that remains to be answered. Will it ever be answered? There is no need for elaboration here. However, for those interested, Prof. Nawaz B. Mody, among others, is trying to provide the answer, supported by, among other sources, the memoirs of Sukarno's close aides Dr. Soebandrio and Omar Dhani, who have made allusions to that effect.
[The writer, a political analyst, received his PhD from The London School of Economics and Political Science.]