Brian Toohey – The appointment of a new police chief in western Papua might seem of little interest to the British Foreign Office. When Timbul Silaen's appointment was announced on December 1 last year, however, the Foreign Office had good reason to take notice. Silaen had been the police chief in East Timor when Indonesian-controlled militia went on a violent rampage against independence supporters in 1999.

At that time, the Red and White Defenders Front, led by Eurico Guterres, was one of the main perpetrators of the violence which was largely orchestrated by Indonesia's Kopassus Special Forces. Guterres and his militia group have now shifted to West Papua (Irian Jaya) where Kopassus is behaving with its familiar brutality. The Islamic extremist group sponsored by the military, Laskar Jihad, is also active.

At the strong urging of the United States Congress (but not the Bush White House) the FBI is continuing to investigate Kopassus' alleged involvement in the August 2002 murder of two American school teachers while picnicking near the huge Freeport copper mine on the southern side of West Papua. Other Kopassus soldiers have been found guilty of the torture and murder of the West Papuan leader Chief Theys Hijo Eluay in November 2001.

None of which provides a comforting backdrop for those concerned about human rights or a stable investment climate. With British Petroleum keen to develop an estimated $22billion worth of gas reserves on the north-west coast of West Papua, the Foreign Office's interest in the signal sent by Silaen's appointment becomes understandable.

According to one of the exiled leaders of the West Papuan independence movement, John Ondawame, he received a good reception from the Foreign Office in London earlier this year. Ondawame told the Weekend AFR that the Foreign Office wanted a "new friendship with the people of West Papua" and appeared "concerned about human rights violations and the lack of progress towards autonomy". Although the Foreign Office does not support full independence, Ondawame said it appeared to understand that political problems for British firms would continue so long as the current level of Indonesian dominance remains. Ondawame said he also detected a shift in interest and understanding in other European capitals he visited on the same trip. The Blair government is turning a blind eye to violations of the supposed ban on the use of British military equipment to kill independence supporters in the Indonesian province of Aceh. However, a Sydney University specialist on West Papua Dr Peter King says commercial considerations coincide with human rights concerns in the Foreign Office's approach to West Papua.

Apart from BP's natural gas project, the Foreign Office is also well aware that the British/Australian mining giant Rio Tinto is a partner in the world's most profitable copper and gold mine at Freeport.

According to Jim Emslie, the author of a recent book Irian Jaya Under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development versus West Papuan Nationalism, BP wants to avoid the problems which have beset Freeport which relies on the Indonesian military to provide it with security services.

Emslie says BP wants to employ locals to handle security in an effort to avoid the heavy-handed approach of the military which has caused deep resentment among villagers around Freeport. Employing local security staff might also help avoid demands from the military for unofficial pay-offs. With the former dictator Soeharto out of the way, pressure for political pay-offs may be less blatant. But the military has strongly rejected BP's attempts to organise its own security for the gas project which is yet to get the final go-ahead.

One obvious difference between West Papua and East Timor is that the latter was never part of the Dutch colonial empire but was only incorporated into Indonesia following the 1975 invasion. Nevertheless, West Papua did not become part of the newly independent Indonesian nation in 1949. After World War II, the Dutch re-established colonial rule over a population which is ethnically and religiously distinct from most of the rest of its East Indies empire.

In 1951, the Dutch government embarked on a development program intended to bring about self government and ultimately independence. On December 1, 1961, an elected People's Congress adopted the Morning Star flag as part of what many Papuans regard as a declaration of independence. However, formal sovereignty was retained by the Dutch who were aiming for full independence by the end of the decade.

Initially the Menzies government decided that Australia's strategic interests were best served by an independent West Papua. However, regardless of the hopes placed in the Anzus Treaty, it could not gain US support for military action in coalition with the Dutch to prevent an Indonesian take-over.

In April 1962 Indonesian paratroopers invaded, but were beaten off by the Papuans. Despite this blunt sign of rejection, West Papua was handed over to the United Nations to administer from October 1962 until Indonesia assumed control in May 1963.

The condition of the handover was that the Papuans were supposed to decide on incorporation into Indonesia within five years. This so-called Act of Free Choice did not occur until 1969. It is widely accepted to have been a sham involving the Indonesian coercion of 1025 local stooges who unanimously accepted incorporation on behalf of the rest of the population.

Many observers now agree that support for independence among Papuans has grown stronger the longer Indonesian rule has been imposed. According to Emslie, who has travelled extensively in West Papua, there is almost complete Papuan support for independence, even if many do not see it as a realistic prospect. But the position is complicated by the presence of a large number of migrants from other parts of Indonesia who have legitimate concerns about how they would fare in an independent West Papua.

Few Indonesian politicians support full independence. An exception was Mohammed Hatta, one of the authors of the Indonesian constitution when independence was achieved from the Dutch. Hatta, who initially served as president Soekarno's vice president and de facto prime minister, feared that the inevitable tensions meant that incorporation would not be worth the candle. In essence, Hatta argued that there was no reason for Indonesians to accept as immutable the boundaries left over from the Dutch colonial era.

However, some Indonesian leaders are willing to accept that a form of autonomy could be preferable to continued dominance from Jakarta which is seen by many Papuans as a continuing form of colonialism. In 2001 president Wahid accepted this view and adopted a "special autonomy plan" which would create a locally elected assembly and the right to raise the Morning Star flag.

The Howard government supported Wahid's move. But no progress has been made under President Megawati Soekarnoputri, who has favoured renewed repression from Jakarta.

Although the Howard government stresses that it fully supports the territorial integrity of Indonesia, it has not abandoned its support for Wahid's proposal which was enacted as law in 2001. The Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, repeated this position in a meeting with his Indonesian counterpart Hassan Wirajuda in Bali in February.

Downer has since taken the unusual step of inviting Emslie's publisher Tony Crawford to lunch to discuss the situation in West Papua. Although Crawford says Downer emphasised his clear opposition to independence, he was interested in obtaining further information about the recent history of West Papua.

Nothing too much should be read into Downer's willingness to discuss differing views on this issue with the owner of a small publishing firm who is a strong supporter of independence. But it does suggest he is far more aware than many Australians of what's potentially at stake in West Papua. Although Australia has commercial interests in the province, it has far bigger grounds for concern than the distant Foreign Office about the repercussions from any savage military crackdown on independence supporters.

Attempts to improve relations with Indonesia would be severely damaged if violence occurred on the scale inflicted on East Timor in 1999. The Australian public could be expected to become particularly anxious if an aggressive military presence in West Papua led to added pressure on Papua New Guinea to do Jakarta's bidding.

Relations with Indonesia will become more brittle if ex-general Wiranto wins the July 5 presidential election. Wiranto, who is the candidate for Soeharto's old party Golkar, may turn out to be more moderate than anticipated if he wins. But his track record as commander-in-chief of the Indonesian military during its campaign of terrorist atrocities in East Timor in 1999 gives little cause for optimism. In these circumstances, increased European support for autonomy and peaceful dialogue in West Papua is a welcome development for Downer.

But the Bush administration is more relaxed about the prospect that the Indonesian military will become more brutally assertive in West Papua. The White House's goal is to achieve a commitment from the Indonesia military to be tough on terrorist groups (other than

Laskar Jihad). As the Menzies government discovered, there are some occasions when US support in dealing with Indonesia can't be taken for granted.