[Intel: Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service Ken Conboy, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, 2004 253 pp.]
Imanuddin Razak, Jakarta – Any book offering a new perspective and information on its subject is always interesting, and even more so when it discusses the activities of an intelligence agency, usually closed to the general public. It inevitably draws people's attention, leaving them anticipating the chance to learn a bit more about the cloak-and-dagger activities of spies and secret agents.
That is part of the attraction of this work by Ken Conboy, who previously authored a book on the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus), and it does turn out to be an intriguing read. Written in a non-scholarly, layperson-friendly style, the book reveals the wide range of activities of Indonesia's state intelligence agency, under its changing names, from BPI to KIN, Bakin, LIN and BIN today, and the "revolving door" of its officials and leadership.
Conboy provides a chronological detailing of the history and major events in the intelligence service, from the establishment of the agency, its development and covert activities, and the many reorganizations. There is more interesting information, including "side" activities not directly related to state espionage, such as the rescue of a son of a pharmaceutical company tycoon and the investigation into the currency counterfeiting activities in the country.
The book also reveals the rivalry between the institution, at that time called Bakin, and the military's intelligence body, Bais, especially during the leadership of Leonardus Benjamin "Benny" Moerdani in the Indonesian military.
All of this makes for captivating reading, but the book fails to identify the grand strategy of state intelligence, especially during the turbulent Soeharto presidency, and crucially lacks first-hand accounts from the two prominent intelligence chiefs, Yoga Sugama and Leonardus Benjamin "Benny" Moerdani, from the 1980s. Conboy did secure information about the two figures' leadership from books on them, media reports, through Bakin's case files and interviews with their subordinates; it's an admirable effort in itself but not quite the same as sitting down for one-on-one interviews.
It would have been a tall order anyway: An intelligence official to the core, Yoga has never swayed from a refusal to discuss the agency's activities, while Benny is ailing (and would be unlikely to open up anyway).
The book reveals the involvement of the state intelligence agency in monitoring and bugging the North Vietnam Embassy and the information office of the communist National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam in Jakarta in the early 1970s, securing information which was of particular interest to Washington.
Other controversial involvements were of Bakin's Special Operation (Opsus) Unit's surveillance activities in Cambodia's internal political affairs, as well as on the embassies of the North Korea, Cuba, China and the Soviet Union. Similar activities were directed at embassies and representative offices of Arab countries, especially in the wake of increasing international terrorism.
Although the lack of transitions between the subjects is jarring, Conboy's work is an interesting read as it complements the limited information about BIN, especially regarding foreign intelligence bodies and foreign agents. The author's previous position as deputy director at the Asian Studies Center, an influential Washington-based think tank on South Asia and Southeast Asia, helps him fill the "missing links" of the local intelligence agency's reports.
The development of the state intelligence body has been inextricably shaped by the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose instructors declared Indonesia's intelligence agents in 1980 as the most capable they had tutored in the past half decade; Israel's Mossad; and Britain's MI6. The growth of the state intelligence body also could not be separated from the fight against communism during the Cold War years because, according to Western intelligence reports, Indonesia was a "fertile breeding ground" for the ideology.
In reading the passages about the 1950s and 1960s, it must be remembered that there were two opposing Indonesian institutions – now defunct Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the military – that won the praise of many political and military analysts because of the strong discipline of their members and their organizations' good management.
Still, it's important for all readers to bear in mind that any divulged information – reports, news, etc. – is still part of intelligence activities, and it's always difficult to tell what is the truth from carefully constructed misinformation. Failure to use a fair dose of skepticism in reading some of the accounts may end up with us accepting a grand ruse.