Recent polls conducted by several research and survey institutes show growing public sympathy and support for retired Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as a possible presidential candidate.
Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) found that Yudhoyono, commonly known as Yudhoyono, received 11.8% of respondents' votes as a potential leader. Another poll, conducted by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), while still seeing incumbent President Megawati Sukarnoputri as the frontrunner, saw Yudhoyono win the votes of 11.2% of respondents.
The Center for the Study of Development and Democracy showed Yudhoyono at the top of the list of preferred presidential candidates with the backing of 15% of respondents, while Megawati was able to score only 4%.
The popularity of Yudhoyono has been on the rise amid increasing disappointment with civilian politicians.
The popularity of the retired four-star general raises many interpretations and analysis. Researchers from LSI like Syaiful Muzani are convinced that the organization's poll result can be read as a strong desire on the part of the general public to go back to the days of Suharto.
The popularity of Yudhoyono is read by LSI researchers as a symbol of public desire for a strong leader with commitment to stability and law enforcement.
Military analyst Salim Said, in an interview with Metro TV, rejected the conclusion offered by Syaiful Muzani as misreading the mood of the public. "The poll results just try to send a warning signal that if the civilian politicians are unwilling to consolidate and improve their strength, it will be possible that there will be a reemergence of a military figure on the political stage," he said.
Despite the debatable conclusion that the general public has the desire to throw support behind the remnants of the New Order regime or former powerful generals, the popularity of Yudhoyono deserves special attention.
He is without doubt the frontrunner should the public crisis of confidence in civilian politicians turn into real votes at the elections.
Yudhoyono is also less tainted than others through his track record as a senior officer during the New Order regime. Unlike former Armed Forces Commander Wiranto or former Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) Commander Prabowo Subianto, Yudhoyono was relatively less involved in the excesses of the Suharto regime because of his relatively insignificant position.
At the time of the attack on Megawati's party headquarters on 27 July 1996, Yudhoyono was chief of staff of the Jakarta Regional Military Command and was a under his superior, Jakarta Military Commander Sutiyoso.
Yudhoyono started to play a strategic socio-political role as a military leader in the post-Suharto era. In November 1998, then President B.J. Habibie appointed him as Armed Forces Chief of Territorial Affairs.
Career moves
Shortly after Yudhoyono graduated from the National Military Academy in 1973, he was posted to East Timor, where he took part in Operation Seroja. Later, he became commanding officer of Dili-based battalion 744.
Much of his military carrier was with the Kostrad airborne unit. In the 1980s and '90s he took several military courses in the US (as well as a MA in business management from Webster University) and in Europe.
He has traveled widely on observer missions around the world, including as Chief Military Observer in Bosnia in 1995-96. Yudhoyono also gained wide respect for his intellectual status.
In the 1980s he lectured at the Army Staff Command College (Seskoad), and he has written several books.
As a territorial military officer, in the mid 1990s Yudhoyono worked in territorial commands in Jakarta and then in the southern Sumatra military command, Pangdam II/ Sriwijaya.
A year prior to the downfall of Suharto in 1997, Yudhoyono was appointed Armed Forces Chief of Staff for Social and Political Affairs, or Kassospol ABRI.
During this period, his capacity as a politician was tested. In the days before Suharto's downfall on 21 May 1998, Yudhoyono was considered to a certain degree, to be part of Wiranto's camp in the personal rivalry with Kostrad Commander Prabowo Subianto, a Suharto son-in-law and son of economic guru Sumitro Djojohadikusumo.
In the palace intrigue involving Suharto's top two generals, Wiranto and Yudhoyono were of one mind in moving to foil the scenario to topple Suharto by automatically promoting his Vice President Habibie. Instead, they believed, both Suharto and Habibie must be removed through a special session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR).
Therefore, in facing the increasing pressures from the university students to bring down Suharto, Wiranto and Yudhoyono expressed the armed forces stand that change must be gradual.
The Wiranto camp suggested the formation of a Reform Council, made up of representative of government, academics and prominent critics.
From this idea sprang the concept of inviting nine respected Muslim figure to the presidential palace on the morning of 19 May. The main objective of the meeting was that Suharto should resign after a period in which he would replace cabinet ministers opposed to reform.
As an initial step, Suharto and his family should hand over their wealth to the nation. After this, legislation should be revised to allow a general election to take place in January 2000 at the latest.
Muslim scholar Nurcholish Madjid was among those who averred that this was the best course to pursue.
This scenario was basically in line with the political preferences of Wiranto, Yudhoyono and the other members of the nationalist "red and white" military faction, on the opposing side to Habibie, Prabowo and other Muslim politicians.
One version of events at the time states that it was at the instigation of Yudhoyono that Madjid prepared a proposal which he gave to Secretary of State Saadillah Mursid, who in turn presented it to Suharto.
The scenario backfired because of the much stronger pressure from students demanding Suharto's resignation. Habibie was forced to seek support from other political factions following the sudden resignation of 14 cabinet ministers initiated by Ginandjar Kartasasmita and Akbar Tanjung.
During the Habibie presidency, Yudhoyono had little space to show his political talent, let alone his ambition, because the principle players on stage in the military circle continued to be then Armed Forces Commander Wiranto, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Feisal Tanjung, and Home Affairs Ministers Syarwan Hamid.
During the Abdurrahman Wahid presidency, Yudhoyono tried to gain the momentum as the only military player available following the removal of Wiranto from political stage, when he was deposed by Wahid because of his involvement in supporting pro-Indonesia militias during the referendum in East Timor.
The erratic and unpredictable Wahid limited Yudhoyono's ability to maneuver, but he played what role he could as a mediator between Wahid and the military, on the one hand, and between Wahid and Vice President Megawati on the other.
Crisis role
As pressure increased for the impeachment of Wahid by the parliament over alleged misuse of Rp35 billion of National Logistic Agency (Bulog) funds, the embattled president looked ready to use extraordinary means to retain power.
Wahid threatened to impose a state of civil emergency, which would have allowed him to avoid the impeachment process by dissolving Parliament and then calling for fresh elections.
In facing such a stark choice, Yudhoyono, then Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, publicly differed with the President's plans and was dismissed for his pains.
Wahid appointed retired Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar, said to be close to Megawati, to the Security portfolio.
Yudhoyono, while out of power, became to be recognized as able to withstand the criticism of his friends in the military, including his former superiors. He began to be seen as a man who carefully calculated the position, and was cautious in expressing his political stand in a decisive moment.
While seen to have ambition, he was regarded more as an intellectual than as a typical military officer.
Back in his old job in government under Megawati, with Gumelar moved sideways to Communications, Yudhoyono continued to display his managerial talent. He also won points for his handling of high-profile cases such as the Bali bombing.
He was also active in initiating the peace accord in Poso together with Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare Yusuf Kalla, and was active on Aceh separatism, religious violence in Maluku, and other conflict issues.
Though sometimes seen as too cautious and indecisive, his handling of the Coordinating Minister position demonstrated talent as a manager and as a good communicator.
His serious handicap is that he has no political support base. His only chance would be at best be a compromise candidate.
While widely identified as a secular-nationalist in outlook, he has been named as a possible candidate by two Muslim-based parties, Amien Rais' National Mandate Party (PAN) and Abdurrahman Wahid's National Awakening Party (PKB).
The polls show that he has won significant support from the urban middle class, sounding warning bells for Megawati.
While Yudhoyono only received 10% of votes from rural respondents in the recent polls, his widespread popularity may make him an ideal running mate.