Speaking at a ground breaking ceremony for the new Batam intelligence academy on 9 July, she said "in today's global world, the use of intelligence expertise can not be limited solely to the military, police and other government organizations, but is also needed for civilian purposes."
"Intelligence gathering," she added, "is widely practiced in economic fields, such as trade and finance, both at the national and international levels."
This appears to represents a paradigm shift within the intelligence community, given the previous hegemony of Army officers in the intelligence community over the last three decades.
Even from the early days of Indonesian independence, the intelligence organizations were initiated by the Army and were militaristic in character.
The early dominance of the military was understandable, since most of the first generation of Indonesian intelligence officers were trained by the Japanese military occupation and its Indonesian force, Peta.
Peta was in itself the creation of a Japanese intelligence agency, Sambobu Tokubetsu-han (Special Task Unit), usually known in Indonesia as Beppan.
Peta officers who underwent more advance intelligence and special warfare training were the instructors in the Yugekitai or I-go Kimutai (First Task Force), an institution geared more towards the type of intelligence used in traditional warfare rather than in guerilla war.
The Yugekitai intelligence training course produced two streams, intelligence officers who came through Army Intelligence proper, and those who came through the Military Police. Among Yugekitai graduates were Zulkifli Lubis, Sudirgo and Nichlany Sudarjo.
Lubis was widely known as a dominant figure in intelligence circles through the revolutionary period and the 1950s, although he was quickly deposed by his rival, then Army Chief of Staff Gen. A.H. Nasution, because of his subsequent involvement in the rebellion in West Sumatra in 1958.
It was Lubis who organized for the first time a republican intelligence group in Yoyakarta, presumably within the Army headquarters or the Ministry of Defense. Lubis first organization was called Special Military Intelligence (Penyelidik Militer Khusus).
In 1947, Defense Minister Amir Syarifuddin ordered a number of different intelligence groups brought under one roof as part of the Defense Ministry. Again, Lubis and the graduates of Yugekitai officer training became the most significant group as A Group.
A Group provided the basis for the post-revolutionary generation of Army intelligence officers, with one stream entering Army intelligence proper like Sutopo Yuwono, and another stream passing on through the Military Police Corps, such as Nichlany and Sudirgo.
Both of these groups continued to play a major role in dominating the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN). Sutopo Yuwono became head of BAKIN and Nichlany was one of his deputies.
During Guided Democracy, a number of new national level intelligence organizations and groups were set up. Among the most significant was the Central Intelligence Board (BPI), headed by Subandrio from its inception in 1959.
When the Supreme Operational Command (KOTI) was announced in 1963 to replace the cabinet, BPI was intended, at least in the eyes of the military, to be part of the operational staff for the anti-Malaysian campaign.
But Sukarno and Subandrio turned it into much more. They saw a threat from the Army under Gen. Nasution, who wanted an integrated intelligence service under the command structure of the military.
In the latter part of the Guided Democracy, BPI became something of a personal political vehicle for Subandrio, who at the time became First Minister and Foreign Minister. His swing to the left provoked resentment from the anti-communist mainstream Army leadership.
When Sukarno was overthrown by the Army led by Suharto in 1966 following the so- called 30 September movement (G30S) which killed six generals, BPI and Subandrio disappeared from the national political scene.
As soon as Sukarno's hand-over of power to Suharto on 11 March 1966, the BPI building was occupied by intelligence units under the Defense and Security Ministry. The Army was concerned to secure the entire troubled intelligence apparatus through an integrated organization, and established a new military body, the State Intelligence Command (KIN).
Its main task was to take over the functions, but not the personnel, of BPI. Caretaker President Suharto was its first head, and Yoga Sugama, who at the time was still in Army intelligence, became Suharto's Chief of Staff of KIN.
In 1967, KIN was reorganized into BAKIN, with a broader brief to coordinate the workings of all intelligence organs, military and civilian. Suharto was still in charge as its head, with day-to day control under Deputy Head Sudirgo.
In 1970, Sutopo Yuwono took over as head of BAKIN. In 1974, following an internal split among the Army top brass, Sutopo was deposed from BAKIN. Yoga Sugama, who at the time was military attachi in Washington, took over.
Under the leadership of Sutopo and Yoga BAKIN was dominated by the first generation of Japanese-trained intelligence officers like Nichlany and Maj. Gen. (Ret) Rujito.
As the intelligence agency directly responsible to Suharto as president, BAKIN, though nominally a civilian organization, was always under military control and staffed at the senior level by serving or retired military officers.
Since its inception, BAKIN was synonymous with the politicized military of Indonesia. It displayed a flair for aggressive intelligence, counter intelligence and covert operations with a combination of deviousness in plotting and was often brutal and malicious in its political interventions.
This bad reputation reached its peak when Ali Murtopo joined BAKIN as deputy head for psychological warfare and covert action.
When Maj. Gen. Sudibyo replaced Yoga in 1989, the protigi of then Defense Minister and Armed Forces Commander Gen. L.B. Murdani turned BAKIN into an organization much more closely integrated into the military bureaucracy.
BAKIN under Sudibyo became a model of the special forces intelligence stream that came to dominate the Army under Murdani.
The opportunity for the special forces to dominate the intelligence game came when Murdani, as the highest military authority, was ordered by Suharto to neutralize the personalized and private Special Operations under Murtopo by reorganizing the bureaucratic intelligence and security apparatus.
Murdani became the leading figure in a new body, the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), established in 1983. BAIS became the military body formally responsible for the collection of intelligence, both external and domestic, and covering military, political and social areas of life.
The term "strategic" was understood to refer to the broad interests of the state, rather than a narrow definition referring to military affairs or international geopolitics.
As the centralized operational intelligence-gathering body closely articulated with the resources of the Armed Forces, BAIS had an operational arm stretching from the line of army intelligence assistants from the office of the Army Chief of Staff down through the Regional Military Commands, Resort Military Commands and the District Military Commands.
With the appointment of Murdani's protigi Sudibyo as head of BAKIN, the intelligence was not only militarized in its body and its working principles, but in personnel as well.
Murdani and BAIS were as militaristic as its predecessor BAKIN. Unlike BAKIN, which draw the best intelligence operatives from various background of society, including his former enemies, BAIS was manned solely by military personnel.
With the incorporation of the special forces red berets of Kopassus into BAIS, the intelligence units of Kopassus became involved in intelligence-based state terror campaigns.
Cases in East Timor, West Irian and extra-judicial killings of criminals in 1983-1984, showed that the red-beret elite shock troops were involved in police-type security operations leading to the arrest and detention or disappearance in counter-insurgency operations and the mysterious killing of 600 alleged gangsters in the first half of 1983.
Even in 1997-1998, when Kopassus was under the influence of Suharto's son in law, commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command Prabowo Subianto, 14 political activists were kidnapped.
Though Prabowo himself was protected from investigation and wrongdoing, several red-beret personnel were implicated in the actions. When Suharto finally was forced to resign in May 1998, de facto the military lost its relevance as an independent political force. Thus, BAKIN and BAIS as the intelligence agencies under the military structure, also lost their initiative as the political outlet for generals from Suharto's inner circle.
In terms of culture, the mindset of the military intelligence officers in both BAKIN and BAIS remained unchanged. They did not want to face the reality that the military no longer has an outlet to play politics and no longer has the legal foundation for justifying their political role.
Internal security, an excuse that gave the military legitimacy to play politics for over the last three decades, now has been taken over by the Police.
The main function of BAKIN in intelligence gathering and analysis has yet to be transformed into a civilian-type intelligence community such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or Britain's M-16.
BAKIN under the leadership of Hendropriyono also lost its initiative, realizing finally that as long as the military character still influences the working principles of BIN, the intelligence agency remains immovable.
As demonstrated through the nationwide hunt for terrorist suspects in the Bali bombing, the intelligence division of the police is looking more professional than the military-based BIN.