[The following is a translation of an interview in Tokyo with Erwanto, a representative Aceh People's Freedom Front (FPDRA).]

The talks between RI and GAM in Tokyo could have succeeded. As a representative of civil society, Erwanti attended the talks between the two sides in Tokyo on 17 and 18 May, the day before martial law was proclaimed in Aceh.

Erwanto: There was a lengthy debate about GAM's active participation in the 2004 elections, followed by an explicit declaration of acceptance of special autonomy. We said that the freedom struggle was not just a GAM struggle but was a struggle of civil society in Aceh. Because we see this as the final objective. Of course our reference is somewhat different from GAM's, and we explained this to the US ambassador (Ralph Boyce) and Martin Griffith of the HDC. A long discussion then followed with some amendments offered by Ambassador Boyce to the effect that GAM should abandon its armed struggle and follow the same perspective. That they would lay down their arms and conduct a political struggle.

RN: So did GAM say they were ready to lay down their arms?

Erwanto: That's right. They said explicitly that they would change the orientation of their struggle from an armed struggle to giving priority to a political movement. At this point, the talks were proceeding well. We felt that they would succeed because there has been concessions from both sides. Then we had to wait while the Indonesian team held a meeting, which took about five hours because they needed to coordinate their position with Jakarta. After waiting for five hours, we along with the GAM delegates consisting of five persons were invited to attend a plenary session, attended by all the participants, minus the Indonesian team. Those present were from the World Bank, the European Union and the donor countries. When this meeting convened, Martin looked very disappointed indeed and said that the final answer had been received from Jakarta. This final draft was very different from their earlier draft and it was very firm.

RN: What differences emerged after they spoke by phone to Jakarta?

Erwanto: It was very rough and very undiplomatic. I myself coming from civil society simply could not accept it.

RN: What did it say?

Erwanto: They have to accept special autonomy and agree to remain within the Unitary Republic of Indonesi. The TNA (GAM's armed force) would have to be disbanded and another point was that all their arms would have to be surrendered. To me, this was very unproductive. The disbandment of the TNA had not been mentioned in the first draft. The Indonesian side had made their position much firmer. We, representing 54 organisations in Aceh, made our point to the GAM team. Our first point was that the purpose of the Joint Security Council should be to strengthen COHA (cessation of hostilities accord) with no further options added. The COHA formulation was already fine and the two sides should focus their energies on the successful achievement of COHA operations in the field. But things were very different after the Indonesian team had consulted with Jakarta. It was very roughly put and showed no respect for their negotiating partners. We had accepted the offer, accommodated it.

RN: Accommodated what?

Erwanto: That GAM would be involved in the 2004 elections but that the offer of autonomy should not be made explicit. That was the essence of the struggle. Then after the Indonesian team consulted with Jakarta, the meeting we had lasted only five minutes. Martin from the HDC had received the final draft from Jakarta.

RN: So Martin had the final draft from Jakarta. What did Martin say?

Erwanto: It was all very rude. After Malik Mahmood read the draft, he immediately rejected it. It took him only five minutes to read it and reject it. After reading it and almost without any consultations with others in his team he said that, with a heavy heart, GAM was unable to accept the draft. And Martin said that what had happened was something that no one had expected to happen.

RN: So what was the point that led to the breakdown in Tokyo? What was the breaking-point?

Erwanto: According to me, Indonesia no longer had any patience to negotiate. They would use this meeting of the Joint Security Council to quit COHA because it would be more respectful to quit the accord at a meeting of the Joint Security Council. And the Indonesian side offered a most extreme option that could not possibly be accepted by GAM. And this provided the political legitimation for Indonesia to quit COHA.