Just five months after the Indonesian Government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) concluded a momentous accord on the Cessation of Hostilities (COHA) on 9 December 2002, which was enthusiatically welcomed by the Acehnese people, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) have started preparations for a major military offensive in Aceh aimed at crushing GAM. Warplanes and warships are being deployed, along with an additional six thousand men in a campaign which, TNI claims, will be completed within six months.
The key player on the Indonesian side during the talks in Geneva that led to the COHA accord was Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, (retired general) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, giving the talks significant political weight. The peace talks have the support of key western powers which strongly favour a peaceful solution to the Aceh crisis. An international group of donors composed of Japan, the US, the EU and the World Bank has pledged $40 million for reconstruction aid.
At the end of April, the Indonesian Government, in clear violation of the terms of COHA, issued a two-week ultimatum to GAM demanding that they formally renounce their long-term political aim of independence and accept Special Autonomy as the final solution for Aceh. The COHA agreement deals specifically with military matters and is aimed at creating a situation of peace; it does not deal with reaching a political solution. Special Autonomy was mentioned only as "the starting point" for the talks which led to COHA.
By issuing this ultimatum, Indonesia has acted unilaterally, displaying bad faith towards the undertakings it solemnly entered into as a signatory of COHA. The Indonesian Government has sought to shift the blame for the breakdown onto GAM because GAM rejected an Indonesian proposal to hold a meeting of the Joint Council – the final arbiter in disputes betwen the two sides – on 25 April and asked for a postponement of two days. Such a minor disagreement could easily have been resolved but Jakarta used this as the pretext to accuse GAM of an "act of humiliation" and issued its ultimatum.
For two months after COHA was signed, there was a marked improvement in Aceh. The level of armed conflict fell as did the number of casualties. Life began to return to normal in the cities and towns, economic activity was restored, markets began to function normally and the Acehnese people enjoyed a welcome period of peace and tranquillity.
But then conditions began to change. On 10 April, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced that the Indonesian armed forces were ready to launch new military operations and even suggested that 50,000 troops would be used to crush GAM. Within days, Susilo's statement was backed by the commander of the Army's Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad), Lt. Gen. Bibit Waluyo who said: "I'm ready to deploy hundreds more reinforcements to Aceh to crush GAM." He was speaking at a ceremony to mark the 51st anniversary of the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus). On the same occasion, the Kopassus Commander, Maj. Gen. Sriyanto, announced that two battalions of Kopassus troops, a total of about 1,600 men, had been sent to Aceh a few days earlier to reinforce the 21,000 military personnel in Aceh. Kopassus troops represent the biting edge of the army, well-trained in intelligence and past-masters at provocative actions. Susilo had clearly come under pressure from the military to change his tune and support their moves to sabotage COHA.
Meanwhile on the ground in Aceh, the monitoring mechanism set up by COHA had been unravelling. COHA provides for the creation of a Joint Security Committee (JSC) headed by a Thai general and composed of 150 personnel, fifty each from Indonesia and GAM and fifty military personnel from Thailand and the Philippines appointed by the Henry Dunant Centre, the Geneva-based conflict-resolution organisation which brokered the COHA deal. JSC offices were set up in districts throughout Aceh.
On 3 March, three JSC monitors in Takengon, Central Aceh, were injured in an unprovoked attack by a mob of men. Then on 3 April the Central Aceh office of the JSC was burnt down by hundreds of men, and three days later, the JSC office in Langsa, East Aceh was set upon by a large mob who arrived on trucks that bore no licence plates. This forced the HDC to order the withdrawal of all the monitors to Banda Aceh, making it impossible for the JSC to function. Witnesses of the attacks on the local JSC offices have testified that the mobs were composed of militia gangs trained by the army; some may even have been Kopassus soldiers wearing civilian dress.
Meanwhile civil society organisations in Aceh had come under attack. The COHA accord stipulates that an All-Inclusive Dialogue "involving all elements of Acehnese society" shall be held, to broaden the base of the dialogue. It also contains a clause (Para 2, f) which states: "Both parties will allow civil society to express without hindrance their democratic rights."
Despite these guarantees, NGO activists have been hounded and arrested or placed on the "wanted" list and forced to go into hiding. On 26 March, two activists from a humanitarian NGO were kidnapped by members of the SGI, a special unit of Kopassus, and have not been heard of since. On February 12, one of Aceh's foremost activists, Muhammad Nazar, chairman of the Council of SIRA, the Information Centre for a Referendum in Aceh, was arrested by the police. At the time it was said that he had been arrested for attending an unlicensed public rally. But he is now on trial for showing contempt for the Indonesian government and could get up to seven years in jail. The police have justified this crackdown by claiming that activists addressed public rallies to undermine COHA and to call for independence.
At the same time, it has become increasingly difficult for foreign observers to visit Aceh. Diplomats in Jakarta have been denied permission to visit the province on the grounds that their security cannot be guaranteed. Aceh is being closed off from outside scrutiny in an attempt to conceal from the world an intensification in the level of armed conflict, a crackdown on civil society and a growing threat to the lives and property of the Acehnese people.
Why has Indonesia changed its tune on COHA? In the lead-up to the talks last year in Geneva, the Indonesian government and its top minister, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, were keen to reach a peace accord. For Susilo, this projected him as a peace-maker and a player on the international scene, strengthening his profile as a leading politician in the months leading to next year's presidential election in Indonesia. However, Susilo does not speak for the military who see their main mission as being to crush "separatists" in Aceh and Papua and safeguard the Unitary State of Indonesia (NKRI).
There are several reasons for the TNI's opposition to COHA. They never agreed in the first place to the move by the Megawati Goverrnment to enter into dialogue with GAM. And perhaps even more importantly, they as well as many top-ranking nationalist politicians in Jakarta, fiercely resent the involvement of an international body, the HDC, in resolving the Aceh conflict. Moreover, they are terrified that this could ultimately lead to Aceh's secession from Indonesia and fear more than anything another "loss" to their prestige, following what they see as the debacle in East Timor.
Unable to learn from their own history of failures to subdue Indonesia's "troublesome" provinces, they have yet again decided to rely on the "security approach" and regard military operations are the only option. However, they recognise GAM as a major political and military force, which has always gained in popularity whenever the TNI has engaged in acts of violence, when the civilian population always take the brunt.
However many men and however much equipment the TNI throws into this latest military adventure, these military operations will not resolve the conflict. COHA is the only way forward and the quicker the TNI recognises this, the better it will be for the Acehnese, for the Indonesian people and government and indeed for the soldiers whose lives are being sacrificed in a misguided endeavour to maintain Indonesia's territorial integrity.
Tapol calls on the international community and in particular those governments which have already pledged support for the peace process and for reconstruction in Aceh:
1. To exert the strongest possible pressure on the Indonesian Government and military to halt the present build-up of troops and military equipment in Aceh and abandon plans for intensified military operations in Aceh.
2. To exert the strongest pressure on the Indonesian Government and GAM to resume talks within the framework of COHA, so as to bring about a reduction in the level of armed conflict in Aceh.
3. To put pressure on the Indonesian government to end its policy of isolating Aceh and allow foreign observers, including UN Special Rapporteurs, to visit the province.