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Making sense of Megawati's Moscow trip

Source
Straits Times - April 19, 2003

Graham Gerard Ong – It may pale in comparison to reports about the postwar reconstruction of Iraq, but the recent public announcement of Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri's official visit to Moscow and her meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin next Monday deserves to be taken seriously.

The four-day diplomatic trip, announced by Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda, not only underlines Indonesia's opposition to the United States-led campaign in Iraq, but is also a signal that it will not have its national interests dictated to by Washington or anyone else.

However, the nuances of the message require some reflection. Indonesia's Foreign Ministry and other diplomatic sources say there are two aims behind the trip. First, it will touch on the Iraq crisis. Second, this common ground will bring the two countries closer together on "bottom-line issues" such as trade – Russia's long-held interest in Indonesia's oil and gas sector, and arms sales.

Though Mr Wirayuda has said the first part of the discussion will focus on the rebuilding of postwar Iraq, the theme will definitely be their shared frustrations with the US. Moscow and Jakarta stand almost shoulder to shoulder on their opposition to the war. Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, has maintained that the military incursion was illegal.

The most populous Muslim country in the world, the Indonesian consensus against the war has been strong and immense. The view was held in official statements by the country's leaders, in proclamations of influential moderate Islamic groups such as the Muhammadiyah, and in the actions of small radical groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front, which had Indonesian recruits volunteering to fight on the side of Iraqi troops.

Yet, both countries failed to stop the war, a shared frustration that will be the basis for an alliance. Mr Wirayuda noted that with "no power to match the US", other countries had a duty to "put stress upon multilateralism to correct this situation".]

Equally interesting was his concluding remark that strengthened ties with Russia was a "strategic" move. He did not say "decisive" or "necessary", which would have conveyed the immediacy of Indo-Russian bilateralism as a check to American dominance in the handling of Iraq. Those descriptions would also have made the intentions behind the secondary discussions on trade and arms sales clear.

American and British companies have long monopolised Indonesia's oil and gas sector. Speeding up Russia's entry into the market could indicate an economy trying to free itself from dependency on Anglo-American foreign direct investment.

Symbol of protest?

It also smacks of protest, in the same way that Indonesia encouraged its citizens to boycott American products prior to the war. As a country still struggling with the same defence concerns since the Cold War, Indonesia is tired of the restrictions caused by a 12-year-old arms sales ban imposed on it by the US, which it feels has no right to dictate on matters of sovereignty, rights and justice.

As an act of defiance and desperation, Indonesia recently purchased from the Russians 10,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles, a squadron of naval Mil-2 helicopters, a dozen amphibious carriers, as well as several premier Sukhoi Su-27 fighter aircraft. It will close more deals at the upcoming meeting.

But the use of the word "strategic" implies the Indonesians, if not also the Russians, have a broader scheme in mind. It raises two questions about Indonesia's current national interests, which are domestic rather than international. Is there an immediate purpose to Indonesia's military upgrading other than to rectify a decade-long security deficit? What else do the two countries have in common?

The answer may lie in their backyards. Just as Russia has to deal with an age-old Chechen insurgency, Indonesia has on its hands a 26-year-old separatist war in Aceh. Both conflicts have claimed thousands of lives and bogged down both governments at home and abroad.

Russian and Indonesian military and political officials have much to gain in sharing their experiences. It is becoming increasingly uncertain whether the fragile peace deal signed between Ms Megawati's government and the rebels of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in December last year will hold, after peace monitors were attacked again last week.

Indonesia's military leadership has confirmed that it is ready to go back to war with GAM. Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said there was no other choice. Indonesia may have 21,000 troops in the province against GAM's 5,000 members, but history suggests that future conflict would be protracted. That is, unless Ms Megawati decides to employ massive firepower against the separatists in the way Mr Putin did with Chechen rebels the last few years.

Mr Putin's dramatic handling of a hostage crisis in a Moscow theatre seized by Chechen rebels in September last year will be a useful lesson for a Jakarta bracing itself for similar violence requiring effective counter-force and international support.

US President George W. Bush defended Mr Putin's handling of the hostage crisis. Perhaps Jakarta hopes for the same should it need to put down GAM using decisive force.

Russia could also do with a Muslim Asian ally in its campaign against the US. It would help allay concerns that it is siding only with "old Europe'. For now, Russia holds veto power in the Security Council and that could be good enough for Indonesia.

[The writer is a research associate at the Institute of South-east Asian Studies.]

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