In the weeks to come, President Megawati Sukarnoputri will face a crucial decision whether she will surrender to pressure from the military hardliners trying to force her to take military action in putting down the separatism group the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).
Growing public and international pressure is also mounting for Megawati to cancel plans to launch a new military operation.
Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said last Monday that the President had already ordered the military and police to be ready for operations in Aceh.
This gave the impression that the government will reverse its position on the cessation of hostilities agreement (COHA) with GAM and undermine the peace process under the pretext of the increasing tension in Aceh.
The pressure from the military hardliners was voiced clearly by Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard Ryacudu. "No country would recognize rebels, let alone negotiate with them. We're all too lenient," he said.
In an effort to show the infectiveness of the Geneva peace agreement signed on December 9 last year, Ryacudu quoted an intelligence report that stated that during the ceasefire, GAM had recruited new members, increasing its strength to 5,000. It also increased its stock of weapons. While previously, they had only 1,500 rifles, they now have 2,100.
Unlike his superior, Armed Forces Commander Endriartono Sutarto, who is more moderate and less confrontational to the government's attempt to negotiate peace, the army chief appears to side with the reactionary group in the army. This group wants to cancel the Geneva Peace Agreement and undermine the process of demilitarization and disarmament established by COHA, a process supposed to be completed by July.
When Ryacudu visited the Pidie military district command last month, hundreds turned out to warmly welcome the general, calling for the military to set up more posts and for the dissolution of the Joint Security Committee (JSC) established to oversee the COHA process and to act as the referee between the government and GAM. The demonstration showed that Ryacudu is generating pressure for an end to JSC.
The military hardliners in Jakarta are quite aware that should GAM finally agreed to lay down its arms and to store all its weapons by July 9, the military would have lost its justification to put down the rebellion through military operations. The military hardliners are also aware that the logical consequence would be to halt all military operations in the province, with redeployment of troops from offensive to defensive positions.
Under such circumstances, the military hardliners in Jakarta would have lost the chance of creating a condition in which Megawati would remain dependent on the military.
In facing such pressure from the military, Megawati has tried to neutralize the military moves. By ordering the military and the police to prepare for armed operations to put down GAM, analysts believe Megawati's aim has been to crystallize vocal resistance to such a move from various sectors of society in Jakarta and Aceh and in the international community.
If the statement was meant to send the message to the anti-military side to raise its game, it achieved its effect. Growing criticism has come from party politicians, academics, NGOs activists, public figures and ordinary people in Aceh.
Ibrahim Ambong, chairman of House Commission 1 overseeing Foreign Affairs, signaled Friday that the parliament may summon Yudhoyono and Armed Forces Commander Sutarto to clarify the government's plan to take military action in Aceh.
The ineffectiveness of the military approach to Aceh was also voiced by former President Abdurrahman Wahid on the same day. Wahid warned that if the government insists on attacking GAM, both the moderate and the extreme wings of GAM will unite in taking up arms against Jakarta.
Megawati witnessed during her childhood the difficulty faced by her father, founding President Sukarno, when he was forced to depend on General Abdul Haris Nasution to put down rebellions in Sumatera and Sulawesi in the late 1950s.
The success of Nasution and the army in undermining the position of the rebellious colonels in the outer islands brought with the high price of a stronger bargaining position for the generals in Jakarta. This in turn prompted Sukarno to strengthen the role of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as a countervailing force against the army led by Nasution and later by Achmad Yani.
After Sukarno's downfall in 1966, several of his ardent supporters said that by building the triangle of Sukarno, the army and the PKI in an effort to create a balance of power among the political elites, Sukarno in reality was trapped in his own game and closed the door to popular support in neutralizing the military's drive to dominate the political scene.
Under strong pressure from Nasution, Sukarno issued the presidential decree known as the decree of July 5, 1959. The essence of this decree was to provide an outlet for the military to play politics independently of the president. At the same time, the decree crippled the function of the political parties.
The situation facing Megawati is quite different, as the system of checks and balances between the executuve and the legislature are functioning well. The parliament is more aggressive than the government.
In a situation where pressure from the general public as well as the parliament is quite strong, the military faces difficulty in dictating to Megawati.
The failure of National Intelligence (BIN) Chief A.M. Hendropriyono to push through the anti-terrorism bill which gives BIN the authority to detain terrorism suspects, has proved the effectiveness of public pressure and the parliament in blocking the hidden agenda of the military.