Alan Boyd, Sydney – A diplomatic offensive by Indonesia appears to have succeeded in bumping West Papua off the global human-rights agenda, and has probably set the stage for a bloody military solution.
As another former renegade province, East Timor, prepares to assume full control of its affairs from a United Nations task force, Papua is struggling against apathy and an acute lack of awareness of its plight.
Only about 60 parliamentarians worldwide have endorsed a campaign for the UN to reopen the case file on a disputed 1969 vote that sealed the province's future as a surrogate state of Indonesia.
There has been a muted reaction to Jakarta's blatant disregard of promised political reforms. And concerns for the safety of multinational investors are taking precedence over alleged abuses by security forces. Activists supporting self-determination for Papuans fear that the tough line taken by Indonesia has scuttled any flickering hopes for a peaceful settlement of a standoff that began long before Timor captured global attention.
"The Indonesian government has recently introduced special autonomy to West Papua, but it is clear that local people will not begin to consider supporting the new political arrangements unless and until their historical grievances concerning the territory's incorporation into Indonesia are addressed, Indonesian troops are withdrawn from the territory, quasi-military forces are disbanded or expelled, and the perpetrators of human-rights violations are brought to justice," the human rights group Tapol warned in a recent report.
So far there has been limited outside support for any of these objectives, reflecting a consensus in diplomatic circles that Papua lacks the strategic interest to force a showdown with Jakarta – whatever its moral claims to unfair treatment.
Indonesia's jurisdiction is based on a contentious 1968-69 poll of hand-picked Papuan leaders, all identified with the central government, who voted for annexation of the territory by Jakarta. Human-rights groups launched a belated campaign in 2001 for the UN to review the legality of the vote, with the eventual aim of restoring an earlier accord that backed Papua's transition to self- determination. Brokered by the United States, the 1962 New York Agreement between Indonesia and Papua's colonial ruler the Netherlands was a stopgap formula that sought to forestall an invasion by Jakarta until a plebiscite could be held in 1969.
Indonesia was given administrative control, but only on condition that rights of free speech and assembly were guaranteed, and that the population was allowed unrestricted movement. Crucially, Article 16 of the agreement stipulated that UN personnel were to be permitted to remain in the territory until the plebiscite had been completed.
Under Article 17, the UN secretary general was to dispatch his own personal representative to Papua in 1968 – one year before the move to self-determination – to ensure the transition was conducted in a free and fair manner. However, UN archives for this period, released in the past two years, indicate that few of the conditions were met.
It is these breaches that provided a basis for a possible diplomatic challenge. There is substantial evidence that the UN team, which was known as the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), quickly succumbed to political and military pressure by Indonesia. "In fact it seems that the UN's priority was simply to ensure that the Papuans acquiesced to whatever fate was decided for them, even if that meant abandoning the central tenet of the agreement," reported Tapol.
Once administrative power had been transferred to Indonesia, the UN officials were told to leave, and the plebiscite was abandoned in favor of the 1969 vote by local councilors chosen by Jakarta. According to papers released by the British Foreign Office, most members of the UN General Assembly accepted that there was little to be gained from challenging Indonesia.
"The strength of the Indonesian position lies in the fact that ... they must know that, even if there are protests about the way they go through the motions of consultation, no other power is likely to conceive it as being in their interests to intervene," the office confided in a 1968 briefing document. "I understand that the exiles may find support in the Australian press. But I cannot imagine the US, Japanese, Dutch, or Australian governments putting at risk their economic and political relations with Indonesia on a matter of principle involving a relatively small number of very primitive people."
Thirty-five years on, former UN undersecretary general Chakravarthy Narasimhan, who personally endorsed the handover to Indonesia, has admitted that the international agency seriously erred. Yet the campaign for a review of the UN's handling of the issue as a possible basis for achieving self-determination has been stonewalled by the same countries that failed to pressure Jakarta when it mattered. No nation has agreed to sponsor a General Assembly motion, and the issue has been studiously avoided by most mainstream political parties.
A petition has been signed by only 63 legislators. With Canberra's support, Jakarta was able to force the Pacific Forum to drop discussion of the Papuan issue from its 2001 summit agenda and shut out delegates from the pro-independence Papuan Presidium Council.
Even the more liberal Western European nations have opted out in the face of a concerted Indonesian diplomatic barrage that has successfully used economic leverage to nullify the movement. Diplomats said concern for Jakarta's appalling human-rights record in the territory was balanced against the limited political awareness of Papuans and the more tangible benefits they could gain from their territory's attractive resource base.
"I think the impression is that one can more easily prepare a poorly developed region for self-determination by raising income levels and enabling the population instead of making empty gestures," said one envoy. "It is a question of not wanting to steer a tribal society toward democracy before it has the institutional supports in place, and in that context [independence] is not necessarily going to be a panacea against violations of individual liberties."
Jakarta has made some concessions to international opinion, though usually as part of a wider political objective. Former president Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie offered a form of restricted autonomy in 1999, when Indonesia was under intense pressure from lending agencies to reduce the dominant role of the armed forces in government. But by the time President Megawati Sukarnoputri came to office two years later, the security services had managed to dilute the reforms and boost their garrison strength under the guise of safeguarding foreign investors.
The Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy (ELS-HAM), a Jakarta-based monitoring group, recorded 136 cases of extra- judicial killing and 838 instances of arbitrary detention and torture between 1998 and 2001, when the reforms were supposed to be implemented.
Conditions have taken a more ominous turn in the past two years, with the assassination of separatist leader Theys Eluay, and an attack on a mining venture operated by multinational Freeport that appears to have been orchestrated by the security forces to discredit resistance groups.
Both incidents followed the start of a 2000 operation code-named Operasi Tuntas Matoa that shifted the burden of suppressing separatist activity from the armed forces to police commandos. "The aim of the operation, as stated in a secret document which is in our possession, is 'to crush the activities of the separatists and their sympathizers'," said leading human-rights activist Carmel Budiardjo. "This is clearly a serious departure from what the police force should be doing and shows that the decision. To separate the police force from the armed forces and place it under civilian control has had no effect in changing the nature and operations of the force."
Militia activities are attracting particular concern after their inflammatory role in East Timor, Maluka and Sulawesi, where they were used with brutal effect to counter grassroots support for separatism. Tapol has accused members of the extremist Islamic Laskar Jihad of inciting growing religious tensions between the predominantly Christian Papuans and Muslim Javanese settlers.
A second group, Satgas Merah Putih (Red-and-White Task Force), which takes its name from the Indonesian flag, is reportedly recruiting and training the settlers for paramilitary activities.
The human-rights watchdog believes the increase in the security presence, especially in border regions, is a prelude to a dangerous escalation of security tensions. "Additional troops have been brought into the Jayapura area to join the already large numbers in place. This, combined with the influx of Laskar Jihad militias into the province, is a recipe for further bloodshed, loss of life and repression for local people," Tapol warned.