Rizal Sukma – After being postponed for almost two weeks from August 5, the government finally issued a "new policy" for Aceh on August 19. The policy, while it continues to stress the relevance of previous "comprehensive policy" to deal with the Aceh problem, has two new, additional elements.

First, it gives the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), an ultimatum to accept the Special Autonomy Law by early December 2002. Moreover, the government maintains that future peace talks will depend upon GAM's acceptance of the law.

Second, if GAM does not conform with the ultimatum by the deadline, the government pledges to intensify its military operations and take "firmer" action in the province. It is also important to note that despite the tough warning, Jakarta has abandoned its previous plan to impose a state of emergency in Aceh, be it military or civil.

However, there is skepticism that the new policy will solve the Aceh problem for two main reasons. First, the new policy, especially the ultimatum to GAM to accept the law by December, is clearly based on flawed logic. While maintaining that it is still open to a negotiated political settlement, the government apparently fails to understand the logic of peace negotiations in resolving a secessionist conflict such as in Aceh.

The conflicting choice between independence (for GAM) and autonomy (for the government) is the core issue in such conflict.

It is predictable that GAM will reject and ignore the ultimatum, because, if GAM does accept the special autonomy law by the deadline, this implies abandonment of the independence demand and then the problem is virtually solved.

The peace talks are meant precisely to resolve the differing position between the government and GAM on the future status of Aceh in relation to Indonesia: autonomy or independence. In other words, for Jakarta acceptance of the law should be the ultimate goal of peace talks, not a precondition for them.

Second, the policy is still based on the assumption that the problem in Aceh can at the end be resolved through military means. This assumption is clearly reflected in Jakarta's threat to intensify military operations in the province should GAM refuse to accept the autonomy law at the end of this year.

In fact, history proves that military means have never succeeded in solving the Aceh problem. The Armed Forces tried to put down the Acehnese rebellion through brutal military operations during the military operation era (DOM) from 1990 to 1998. The military operation, instead of bringing an end to the rebellion, merely resulted in the growing appeal of independence to the Acehnese. Gross violation of human rights by the military during that period drove many to join the secessionist movement.

More importantly, it is difficult to understand what the government means when it insists on "firm" military action against GAM if it fails to meet the December deadline. Does it mean that over these years, especially from early 1999 onward, the government or TNI was not yet "firm" in carrying out its counterinsurgency operation against GAM in Aceh?

Indeed, such a statement begs many questions. The military authorities in Aceh, for example, revealed that security forces killed more than 950 GAM members since May 2001 (Serambi Indonesia, July 31, 2002). TNI forces also managed to kill GAM Commander Teungku Abdullah Syafii earlier this year. Indeed, media reports also suggest that the security apparatus in Aceh has been actively engaged in counterinsurgency operations against GAM. In such circumstances, repeated threats by the government that it will take "firmer" military action raises two areas of speculation.

First, as the threats have already been made repeatedly over the last three years, the latest threat might simply reflect the government's frustration due to its inability to solve the Aceh problem. Second, the threat might also reflect the inability of security forces to carry out a counterinsurgency operation of sorts so that they would have a freer hand in using military might.

Whatever message the government intends to convey through the ultimatum and threat, it seems that peace remains as remote as ever in Aceh. Here, it is important to stress that the peace talks remain the best policy option for both sides.

GAM's acceptance of the special autonomy law as an entry point for further peace talks and negotiations should be seen as progress. The government should capitalize on that and move to reach other agreements and achieve progress on areas that were agreed upon by both sides in Geneva May 2002.

For the next round of peace talks, rather than quarreling on autonomy or independence, both sides should focus on reaching an agreement to an end of hostilities and violence and a monitoring mechanism. At the moment, saving the lives of thousands of Acehnese is more important than any other issue.

Indeed, priority should be given to peace talks. That, however does not mean Jakarta should abandon its right to preserve and maintain law and order in Aceh. The problem here is how to exercise that right.

Professionalism, discipline, improved operational capability in conducting counterinsurgency operations and an appropriate degree of civilian control over the military have become imperative. However, one should not forget that any operation "to win hearts and minds" in Aceh would not bring about any significant result if the government continued to ignore the resolution of human rights cases and the implementation of promises in socioeconomic fields.

The four dimensions of conflict resolution – peace talks, the maintenance of law and order, human rights trials and social and economic improvements – should be carried out in tandem.

[Rizal Sukma is the Director of Studies, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.]