A Defensive Alexander Downer undoubtedly has his eyes on the history books with the publication of the Government's apologia for its handling of the East Timor crisis. But East Timor in Transition 1998-2000, the official Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade account of the tumultuous period and Australia's role in mediating the crisis, deserves more than cursory dismissal. This is not merely a political tract designed to justify the minister and the department's conduct in the face of criticism they did not do enough to prevent devastation and violence – or that we did too much.

The book, prepared by former members of DFAT's East Timor desk, offers some answers to three key questions about Australia's conduct: did John Howard's infamous December 1998 letter to then Indonesian president B.J. Habibie urging a process of self-determination force an independence vote too early; how much did Australia know of the links between the Indonesian military and the East Timorese militia; and could Australia have forced a peacekeeping mission before violence ensued?

The book argues persuasively that the Prime Minister and Mr Downer could not have foreseen Dr Habibie's rapid move towards a ballot on independence. The Australian Government took a decision to make a substantial shift in East Timor policy, and urge an act of self-determination at some time in the future. It did not advise Dr Habibie, who cited Mr Howard's letter as a motivating factor, to radically narrow the timeframe. This was, as the book correctly notes, at odds with both Mr Howard's views and those of East Timorese leaders. And there was little Australia and other critics could do.

A more contentious issue is the extent to which Australia was aware of the Indonesian military's backing of the militia build-up in East Timor. The book reveals that contrary to some public statements at the time, Mr Downer and other officials did have detailed knowledge of the links from early 1999. But, the book argues, it was impossible to determine the extent and nature of the military's collusion with the militia, or the extent to which their actions were sanctioned, or ordered by Jakarta.

Mr Downer and others deserve to be questioned for downplaying the problems publicly, and perhaps even dissembling, while being aware of them privately. Yet at the diplomatic and military level and in Dili, as the book shows, Australia was working furiously to persuade Indonesia to rein in the military, despite their frequent denials of collusion. There is some merit to Mr Downer's argument that revealing more publicly would have jeopardised communications with the Indonesians and not necessarily have helped prevent violence. Mr Downer could, however, have handled the public presentation better. World opinion was hardening against Jakarta and Australia could have been more forthright in attacking the military's backing of violence.

The book offers a similar defence of the Government's position on peacekeepers. Faced with Indonesia's refusal to accept foreign forces, and in the absence of UN support, there was indeed little the Howard Government could practically do to force Jakarta's hand.

The 314-page book reveals, above all, that Mr Downer and his bureaucrats remain highly sensitive about the assessment of the impact of the East Timor crisis on longer-term relations between Australia and Indonesia.

With Abdurrahman Wahid's recent visit there has been a marked thaw. But only history will tell if Alexander Downer will be remembered as the foreign minister who resolved Australia's intractable East Timor problem.