John McBeth, Jakarta – When Lt.-Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah threw a party on his recent forty-ninth birthday, guests weren't sure whether the flowers delivered to his house were for a celebration or a wake. Certainly, it's no military secret why most of the general's brother officers failed to show up for the affair. The maverick reformist, whose outspoken comments have alienated other officers, has few friends left in the Indonesian armed forces these days. And his closest ally in the government, President Abdurrahman Wahid, seems powerless to help him, having tried and failed to instal him as army chief.
If the military reform movement has come to a virtual standstill, then the 59-year-old Wahid himself carries much of the blame. His failure to build a robust and responsible government – at a time when the army is probably in its most weakened state – means he has failed to achieve what he always declared to be his top priority: establishing the principle of civilian supremacy over the armed forces and the government of Indonesia after three decades of President Suharto's military-backed iron rule.
More importantly, armed-forces leaders, irritated by the president's interference in their internal affairs and perceived missteps in dealing with secessionism in the sprawling archipelago, have been moving increasingly closer to Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri, putting pressure on the president's own position at the helm.
By vainly pushing for Wirahadikusumah to become army chief of staff in a proposed military reshuffle in early October, Wahid naively believed he could use one man to gain ascendancy over the army leadership. "I feel sometimes I have no control over my government," he is reported to have told a visitor in September while discussing his plans to promote the outspoken reformist. "I don't get a response from anyone. I need a way to assert my authority."
Wirahadikusumah was clearly not the way. Reluctantly, Wahid agreed to appoint Lt.-Gen. Endriartono Sutarto to replace Gen. Tyasno Sudarto, an opportunist whom the reformers once counted as an ally. The president then sought in vain to shoehorn Wirahadikusumah into the post of deputy army chief.
Again, the appointment was blocked by army leaders annoyed at Wahid for championing a general whose insubordination and public disclosures have riled almost the entire officer corps. They were particularly outraged by his leaking of the results of a corruption probe into the Army Strategic Reserve's charity foundation, apparently because he feared it would be covered up.
Now, the army appears to be getting its own back on the president. In quick succession, armed-forces commander Adm. Widodo Adisutjipto and territorial-affairs chief Lt.-Gen. Agus Widjoyo have called for a reassessment of the government's policies on security affairs. Taking the hardest line, Widjoyo described Wahid's political approach to the problems of Aceh and Irian Jaya as "cumbersome" and said the decision not to use the military had restricted its general effectiveness in putting down unrest.
Given the renewed parliamentary pressure Wahid is under over two financial scandals, analysts are focusing on the military's increasingly warm relations with Megawati, a conservative reformer and like-minded nationalist who is known to be close to Widjoyo.
Megawati, leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle, or PDI-P, is already unhappy with Wahid for failing to consult her over August's cabinet changes and also for actions that are seen as having encouraged secessionists in Irian Jaya.
Some PDI-P members, aware of the armed forces' unpopularity in Indonesia and haunted by the memory of the military's persecution of Megawati's supporters during Suharto's rule, are nervous about the vice-president's relationship with the generals. But a senior party official says: "It's the military which is trying to get close to her. They want to get under her umbrella."
Megawati still supports Wahid, but she has instructed her MPs to get to the bottom of the two scandals and has indicated she may change her stance if there's hard evidence implicating the president. It wouldn't be difficult to get the party behind her: The senior party official says 80% of PDI-P legislators want Wahid to step down. Avoiding direct confrontation with Wahid appears to be the name of the game.
When the army wanted Wirahadikusumah removed as commander of the Strategic Reserve in July, it was Megawati who conveyed the message to the president. In early October, she handed him an unprecedented letter signed by 45 generals calling for Wirahadikusumah to be taken before a military honours board, which can recommend dismissal.
Insiders claim the vice-president was also prevailed upon to telephone a string of generals to congratulate them on their proposed appointments in the latest reshuffle – before Wahid had approved them.
Nobody really knows where this growing relationship with the military will lead, but under the constitution Megawati would succeed to the presidency should anything happen to the beleaguered Wahid. The military may, in a sense, be playing the PDI-P leader off against him.
Given her reputation as a conservative, Megawati would be unlikely to push hard for accelerated reform. She is also known to be sympathetic to former armed-forces commander Gen. Wiranto and other generals facing indictment for their alleged role in last year's militia rampage in East Timor.
The anti-Wirahadikusumah campaign has extended as well to US Ambassador Robert Gelbard, who has been under fire in recent weeks for allegedly interfering in Indonesia's internal affairs. The US embassy was forced to issue a furious denial after outspoken new Defence Minister Muhammad Mahfud claimed Gelbard had sought to influence the selection of the new army chief – an accusation that may have been designed to stir up nationalist sentiment and paint Wirahadikusumah as a US puppet.
"The US embassy is deeply concerned by these kinds of false statements emanating from the Ministry of Defence and elsewhere," said an October 16 statement.
With the apparent eclipse of Wirahadikusumah and the weak ties between Wahid and his armed-forces chiefs, the military reform process has effectively stalled.
"He is a one-man crusade," Hasnan Habib, a former Defence Ministry chief of staff, says of Wirahadikusumah. "He is looking for public support outside the armed forces and he shouldn't have done that." Wirahadikusumah is not the only officer, serving or retired, who actively supports reforms. But he is by far the most vocal and the most insistent, saying that if it was left to the military there would be little or no change. He wants the military out of parliament now and has been campaigning to dismantle most of its influential territorial structure – the key to much of the military's post-economic crisis money-making. He seeks a new commitment to professionalism, an overhaul of the current command structure and more attention and resources for the main combat units.
But with Indonesia facing probably its toughest-ever test of stability and unity, Gen. Widjoyo and others have long made it clear that the pace of military reform depends on whether civilian leaders can guarantee the country's territorial integrity and get on with their own stalled reform programme.
Thus, Wahid's failure to create a strong government has weakened his hand with the military and hampered his chances of establishing civilian supremacy.
"Is it relevant to ask if the government is in control of the military? This shouldn't be a one-sided affair – it depends on how mature the civilians are in their handling of the military," a top general said in a recent unattributable briefing.
The pace of reform clearly lies at the root of the argument and no one in the military wants to reverse changes implemented to date. But many officers simply cannot accept a situation where they won't have their place in the sun.
Indeed, with little commitment among those in strategic positions to internal reform, progress toward these goals is likely to be at a measured pace. The military will retain a political role through representation in the People's Consultative Assembly, Indonesia's highest legislative body, until at least 2009, while officers say dismantling the territorial structure could take 10 years.
It's unclear when Wirahadikusumah's reform ideas began to crystallize, but a senior US officer recalls: "He's certainly been a hard-core reformist as far back as I can remember. In fact I'm amazed he's got away with what he has." Now that the gloves are finally off, those days may be over. But removing the army's only real reformer is another black mark Indonesia will have to bear.