The Indonesian air force announced plans to ask China to provide and help maintain aircraft and weaponry, reported Agence France- Presse April 10. In particular, Jakarta lacks adequate radar and navigation equipment.
Officials cited the need to fill the supply vacuum created by US suspension of military cooperation after the violence following East Timor's September 1999 independence referendum.
On the surface, it appears that US refusal to reinstate military ties is self-defeating, rapidly pushing Indonesia closer to China and other Asian allies. Yet going deeper, the apparent US inflexibility toward the current Indonesian regime may in fact be a reaction to what US officials consider a fundamental element of Wahid's strategy: a realignment of Indonesia away from the West and toward China. Rather than attempt to woo Wahid and strengthen his position, Washington may prefer to facilitate a transition in power.
Washington's reluctance to reinstate military ties with Indonesia appears, at first glance, inexplicable. Wahid's policy with regards to domestic affairs has been everything US officials have wanted. Indonesia's president has cracked down on the military, sought a peaceful resolution to separatism in Aceh and held his country together when every indicator suggested sudden and violent disintegration.
The source of US hesitation likely lies not in Wahid's domestic policy, but in his foreign policy. Since he came into office, he has sought closer ties with China. His first official state visit was to Beijing, where he promised President Jiang Zemin that his government would strive to guarantee equal rights to Chinese- Indonesians, who were the target of riots in 1998. In recent weeks, he has discussed plans to lift the country's ban on communism, likely in an attempt to facilitate close relations with China. Moreover, the president has conspicuously avoided the United States and Australia in his search for aid and investment. He has also aligned closely with Malaysia, which has a strong anti-US and pro-Russia and China orientation.
Today's announcement from the Indonesian air force may conflict with the US agenda in more ways than one. Through military cooperation with China, Indonesia will become more independent from the United States. As well, it may enable Wahid to purchase military equipment from Israel, which has so far shirked US pressure to discontinue lucrative arms sales to China. Israel does bustling trade with Beijing, particularly in the field of avionics. Beijing could easily act as go between, allowing Wahid to trade with Israel without incurring the wrath of his political opposition and that of the public, which is 80 percent Muslim.
Historically, the United States has not taken well to pro-China Indonesian leaders. In the 1960s, President Sukarno appeared to lean toward communism, anti-Westernism and a Chinese alliance. The CIA reportedly supplied lists of Indonesian Communist Party members to Gen. Suharto, aiding him substantially in his bloody overthrow of Sukarno. Suharto's regime, while autocratic and repressive, ushered in a long era of alignment with the United States. Yet with the collapse of Russia, the United States abandoned Suharto's regime; his corruption and violation of democratic and human rights began to outweigh his value as a pro-US bastion in the region. Now Russia and China are reestablishing old ties in the region, and old US priorities are resurfacing.
To the US government, Indonesia's alignment may once again appear in flux. The failure to reinstate military ties would be part and parcel of this anxiety. On the one hand, the Clinton administration may be afraid to cash in its major bargaining chip when it looks as though it may fail to win Wahid's loyalty.
On the other hand, the administration may be hoping that internal politics will either force Wahid to reconsider, or force him out of office entirely. While the president now enjoys fairly solid support, his Muslim opposition has recently risen in popularity. These parties concur with the US agenda on two main points: They tend to be anti-Chinese and anti-Israeli.
Muslim parties like Assembly Speaker Amien Rais' National Mandate Party (PAN) have attacked Wahid's attempts to establish trade and diplomatic links with Israel.
More recently, they have decried his controversial plans to lift the ban on communism in order to gain more support. Rais, long Wahid's rival for power, has led the criticism. On April 7, 5,000 demonstrators rallied in Jakarta against the plan. If the Muslim parties continue to successfully foment such opposition, they can easily link the communism issue to Wahid's engagement of China in order to rile up more support.
At this point, Washington is likely still deciding which constitutes the safer bet: Wahid or his competition. The decision is not nearly as clean-cut at it was in 1965.
Given the political winds blowing in Asia, a new government could be just as wary of the United States as is Wahid. More significantly, supporting Wahid's less-moderate Muslim competition could deliver the country into the hands of extremism. In coming months, Washington will be watching Wahid's opposition very carefully, hoping to ascertain their attitude toward the United States and toward Indonesia's alignment.