Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid has proposed breaking his country's reliance on the United States for military equipment. He proposed that instead the domestic defense industry expand along with a network of international suppliers. Wahid appears to be seeking leverage for an upcoming visit to Washington. But his stance opens up new opportunities for other suppliers, notably Russia and China. Wahid accurately assumes that Indonesia is vital to US security concerns; he may be mistaken, however, in his belief that Washington will simply watch Jakarta's military enter into new strategic partnerships.

Addressing members of Indonesia's Air Force Special Troops (Paskhas) on March 25, President Abdurrahman Wahid called for Indonesia to break its military dependence on the United States. The president's comments are less about market dominance than strategic dominance. Since his election, Wahid has paid the United States little diplomatic heed, instead focusing on Asian neighbors and calling for greater cooperation with China and India.

In reality, US arms sales and military cooperation with Indonesia have declined sharply over the last few years. Now, Wahid is suggesting that the military buy from countries like France or Russia. Wahid said he did not fear a backlash from the US for his decision to diversify weapons sources. "They also need us," he said.

"Without us, security in this region is not guaranteed." The Indonesian president is likely correct that Washington considers his country important to regional stability, but he may be miscalculating the potential American response. With Wahid contemplating greater cooperation with Russia and China, the United States is unlikely to take a passive stance.

Wahid's presidency is re-shaping Indonesia's relationship with China, both by easing the government's strict anti-communist stance and by growing more friendly with the country's ethnic Chinese elite. Wahid has steadily promoted a shift in Indonesia's anti-Communist policies, which were established following a 1965 coup attempt attributed to pro-Communist forces potentially supported by China. Over the past week, the president has advocated the reversal of a law that forbade the teaching of communist ideology in Indonesia and that blocked the activities of the Indonesian Communist Party. His calls triggered a domestic backlash, similar to that when he earlier attempted to open relations with Israel.

Though he has justified these moves as helping Indonesian democracy, they appear to be part of a series of overtures toward Beijing. In early March, Wahid eliminated a law allowing special investigations into all political candidates, which had previously been used to look for communist connections. He has also expanded on efforts by former President B.J. Habibie to reverse anti-ethnic Chinese laws, established in conjunction with the country's anti-communist regulations.

Both presidents have been motivated by economics. Indonesia's ethnic Chinese minority controls a substantial portion of the nation's capital. This, however, has often made them the target of domestic unrest, inducing many to flee the nation – with their money. In addition to reversing capital flight, Wahid has deeper reasons for promoting greater acceptance of China. During his speech to the Paskhas, Wahid said the United States does "not simply want to help us, they want to sell to us." Wahid said Indonesia had been "made dependent on the United States," both economically and militarily, adding, "I have thought for a long time about reducing our acquiescence to the US and depending more on our own capability."

Wahid's statements appear to stem more from strategic and political considerations than from a real concern over the United States cornering the Indonesian arms market. The United States has traditionally been Jakarta's primary weapons supplier, with over $1 billion in arms sales since 1975. But the flow of weapon systems has waned considerably in the last few years. Human rights lobbies have played a key role in reducing arms sales. In 1993 the State Department banned small arms sales; in 1995 and 1996 the ban was expanded to include helicopter-mounted armaments and armored personnel carriers. In September 1999, following accusations of military human rights abuses in East Timor, the United States suspended all new and pending commercial and foreign military sales to Indonesia.

While Indonesia still relies on the United States for spare parts and system upgrades, Jakarta has already been weaned from Washington's military assistance. The 1997 Asian economic crisis further reduced Indonesia's arms expenditures, and the European Union – whose sales have often collectively surpassed that of the US - dropped its own arms embargo in January 2000.

Both Europe and Russia have entered the picture. But the government appears to be looking to China for both military support and strategic positioning. Wahid has promoted greater cooperation with China since before he was elected President, vowing to make Beijing one of his first official visits. Wahid's visit in December 1999 was followed by bilateral economic and political consultations. Jakarta's newfound openness to China after years of estrangement, coupled with calls for decreased dependence on the United States, presents a troubling situation for Washington.

The Indonesian president expressed little concern for a US backlash, noting that Indonesia remains strategically vital to the region. However, it is this same vital position that will induce Washington to react rather than sit back and observe. Indonesia would not be alone in finding important, new strategic partners.

Malaysia, a growing ally for Indonesia, is a long-time vocal opponent of US regional hegemony. Malaysia is a major purchaser of Russian arms and is increasing its contacts with China. At a recent defense meeting, the idea of joint Malaysian-Chinese military exercises was even broached. Adding to this, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei have proposed greater trilateral cooperation.

Wahid intends to use his apparent lack of concern as a bargaining tool in his upcoming April visit to Washington. However, he may be overly optimistic about his leverage.

Former Indonesian President Sukarno's flirtation with communism and Beijing – in addition to Phnom Penh, Pyongyang and Hanoi – spawned the 1965 coup attempt. In the wake of the failed takeover of the government, a wave of anti-Communist and anti-Chinese sentiments fueled the executions and arrests of millions and led to decades of institutionalized discrimination against ethnic Chinese.

While Washington is unlikely to advocate a similar course of events at this time, it will not sit back and watch as the regional balance of power slips into the hands of Chinese and Russian governments. US military ties can be resumed. Other measures could include inducing allies in Europe and Asia to increase diplomatic and military ties with Indonesia as proxies. Washington may also take a more extreme measure and implement sanctions against Jakarta, though US imports represent less than 15 percent of Indonesia's exports.

Another possibility may be calling Wahid at his own game; the country's Muslim majority could easily find the new policies distasteful.